PPECMC2021CovidCrusaders

It is interesting where Brettschneider draws the line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in punishment. In a fascinating tactic, Brettschneider chooses to argue against the practice of capital punishment on political grounds, not against the act of murder - “I attempt to argue against capital punishment from a political conception of the citizen” (108). I claim that a life sentence also violates “the political conception of the citizen.” Brettschneider addresses this concern, but not in its entirety. He responds that life in prison is different from capital punishment because of the ability to appeal. Judges can incorrectly cast someone as guilty. If that person is dead, then the person cannot demand a re-trial. The person sentenced to life in prison still has the right. It is not obvious why the person sentenced to life in jail has not been robbed of their political citizenship. This is true even in light of the privileges that Brettschneider wants to offer criminals, as...

Miller - Blog Post 9

In Chapter 5 of Democratic Rights , Corey Brettschneider discusses the rights of the punished. Expanding on his argument from Chapter 3, Brettschneider contends that persons subject to state coercion, such as criminals, should be treated as citizens. He advances arguments for democratic contractualism, described as “the ideal of the citizen” which justifies “coercion by regarding all persons subject to state force as free and equal” (101). The implication of this is that criminals, many of whom fail to respect fellow citizens as free and equal, still deserve rights which will limit the types of state punishment that can be imposed. To illustrate democratic contractualism, Brettschneider contrasts it with Hobbesian and retributive approaches to punishment. Brettschneider explains that “whereas Hobbes labels criminals “enemies” outside the social contract, contractualist justification views even the worst offenders as citizens and requires that the coercion they face be reasonably ...

Krasemann - Blog Post 9

In Chapter 3 of Democratic Rights, Corey Brettschneider explores the notion of democratic citizenship as opposed to legal citizenship. I find the distinction to be interesting and worth looking into further. In his words, “persons who are not legal but moral citizens can embrace the ideal of democratic citizenship when they think and deliberate about public policies and basic rights” (60). What role do legal citizens play in society as opposed to democratic citizens? Brettschneider does not view citizenship as a legal term, but rather a moral one. Moral citizenship is “a principle of treatment that con-strains how democratic polities can coerce all persons subject to their control” (61). Brettschneider establishes that “ citizens are persons entitled to be treated in accordance with the three core values and obligated to treat their fellow citizens in the same way” (58). I immediately considered the social position of illegal immigrants. Brettschneid...

Gero - Blog Post 9

In Chapter 3 of Democratic Rights , Professor Brettschneider distinguishes between a legal and moral citizen. He defines moral citizens as “persons coerced by law who are entitled to be treated as sovereign in a manner that accords with the core values” (page 60). Unlike legal citizens, moral citizens are not granted the full range of political rights (page 60). The concept of moral citizens can be especially helpful when discussing the rights of illegal immigrants. Earlier in Chapter 2, Professor Brettschneider clarified that resident aliens “retain a right to be treated as democratic citizens in a moral sense because of their status as addressees of law” (page 32). If one is to extend this analysis to consider illegal immigrants as moral citizens and addressees of the law, then deportation of illegal immigrants is unjustifiable coercion that undermines their sovereign status and violate...

The Principle of Inclusion

Consider some of the accounts of impartiality that we have taken up. Rawls models impartiality through the original position, as, in effect, ignorant partiality -- partiality to oneself, not knowing which self one will turn out to be. The utilitarian takes impartiality to be achieved through occupying the view from nowhere , from no particular point of view, a God's Eye point of view that is neutral among all agents, and attempts to promote the best outcome overall across agents. The principle of inclusion, by contrast, takes impartiality to be achieved through occupying the view from everywhere , from every particular point of view. It asks, in the formulation of institutions, laws, and acts, for each particular person, "What types of state coercion can a person reasonably accept if she embraces the core values of democracy -- and is motivated to find agreement with his or her fellow citizens? What types of state coercion can the same citizen reasonably reject?"...

Kim Blog Post 9

In chapter 3 of Democratic Rights , Brettschneider makes an argument for democratic contractualism "as an account of legitimate coercion of citizens, draws from the concern to assure that the rights of individuals are protected."(pg. 57) To do so he makes the distinction between three terms: persons, people and citizens. Persons are individuals as they are: "defined by their distinct understandings of their own wills" (pg. 57) Persons are not tied to the core values of equality and can treat one another in an inegalitarian manner. People are defined as a community in which members treat one another in accordance with the three core values of democracy. Citizens are individual members of the 'people' who treat other members in accordance with the three core values. He describes citizenship as an "ideal relevant to democratic coercion" and "limited to theorizing about politics and legitimate coercion." (pg. 58) He makes the argume...

Mehra - Blog Post 9

In Chapter 5 of Democratic Rights, Professor Corey Brettschneider argues through democratic contractualism that there must be limitations on state punishment such criminals are treated in their capacity as citizens. Criminals must maintain substantive rights (like the right to free speech, the right to vote in national elections, and the right to life). Specifically, Brettscneider argues that the state must “formulat[e] punishments in a manner consistent with the core values,” meaning that “we should act which punishment a criminal qua citizen reasonably could accept” (97). While I understand the importance of the state acting in accordance with the core values (such as by upholding the rule of law), I question whether the states hurts more people than it protects when recognizing criminals-- particularly violent ones-- in their capacity as citizens who can uphold the core values. Brettschneider argues criminals should be treated as citizens because they are subject to ...

Fish- Blog Post 9

In Democratic Rights , Corey Brettschneider provides his account of democratic contractualism. This is a theory that, “as an account of legitimate coercion and the rights of citizens, draws from the concern to assure that the rights of individuals are protected because of their status as members of a sovereign people” (57). In his account, he distinguishes between “persons” “people” and “citizens” as he rejects the “unanimous will” of the people (57). However, in making this distinction, Brettschneider only addresses the importance of separating these three entities in the political sphere, and does not account for the potential danger in believing individuals have the capacity to compartmentalize these parts of themselves. Specifically, the difference Brettschneider draws out between “people” and “persons” poses a number of concerns when it comes to feasibility. He defines persons as “individuals defined by their distinct understandings of their own wills” (57). In contrast, people “r...

Kim Blog Post 8

In Chapter 1 of When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, Corey Brettschneider makes an argument for value democracy. He makes the argument that a value democracy by respecting rights and only criticizing, in a noncoercive manner, viewpoints incompatible with the idea of free and equal citizenship avoids the dystopias of both the Invasive State and the Hateful Society. He illustrates the most obvious viewpoints that would violate the ideal of free and equal citizenship as ones that "make discriminatory legal distinctions between classes of persons," on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender. (pg.24) Associations like the Ku Klux Klan would be an example of a group holding paradigmatically implausible views that the state should rightly criticize. However, other groups, like religious groups, may hold "equally discriminatory beliefs for reasons that are less obviously ill-intentioned."(pg. 49) I would like to focus my concern on cases in which views are less o...

Stevens Blogpost 8

In the Introduction chapter, Brettschneider considers what types of free speech should be protected under a democratic government. Brettschneider argues that we should distinguish a state’s coercive power, the ability to restrict the expression of certain hateful views, from the state’s expressive power, the ability to influence beliefs by “speaking” to hateful groups directly. By protecting the expression of hateful views but also recognizing the state’s obligation to speak out against them, Brettschneider believes the state can both avoid falling into the free speech paradox and protect the democratic rights of all its citizens. One of my concerns with Brettschneider’s argument is that if the state speaks outs against some hate speech, it will end up tacitly approving the speech it does not condemn. If the state recognizes and condemns racist anti-Black rhetoric, but then fails to condemn (whether for political reasons or general ineptitude) say, anti-immigrant hate s...

Simionas Blog Post 8

In his introduction, Brettschneider presents his solution to the debate of neutralists and prohibitionists on the types of free speech that should be protected or not. His solution is to “distinguish between a state’s coercive power, or its ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and its expressive power, or its ability to influence beliefs and behavior by ‘speaking’ to hate groups and the larger society” by “simultaneously protect[ing] hateful viewpoints in its coercive capacity and citizen them in its expressive capacity” (4). My concern with his argument is the practicality between a government convincingly expressing its disapproval of ideas that it cannot coercively challenge. Actions that are expressive in nature and attain their value from being expressed run the risk of being replaced with performative actions. Some current examples of this can often be seen in U.S. politics in discrepancies between political leaders’ messages and actions. It is almost insulti...

Huang - Blog Post 8

In the introduction of “Averting Two Dystopias,” Corey Brettschneider outlines his main argument vouching for “value democracy” as opposed to a neutral or prohibitionist approach to rights protection, particularly concerning free speech. A neutralist viewpoint on neutrality is one that values free speech and rights to the extent that it seeks to protect all expressions of opinions, while a prohibitionist one uses coercive policies in an attempt to limit or even ban “hateful viewpoints.” Brettschneider defines “hateful viewpoints” as “opinions that are openly hostile to the core ideals of liberal democracy” (1). In contrast to these two main conceptions of handling “hateful viewpoints,” Brettschneider offers a third one: “value democracy,” which instead seeks to avoid the paradox of rights between the invasive state and the hateful society by engaging in democratic persuasion. The invasive state is a government that may violate some rights, limits freedom of speech, against illiberal va...

Ivashkiv blog 8

In Chapter One, “The Principle of Public Relevance and Democratic Persuasion,” Brettschneider outlines the foundation of his theory of value democracy. He envisions a society that allows for “equal citizenship under the law” (31). His solution is to have a state that condemns all speech or legislation that seeks to limit the rights of different groups of the population. In Section III, he proposes that this limitation will relate to political terms, not the general notion of equality. Interestingly, Brettschneider recognizes that “the principle of public relevance is potentially quite broad because it concerns citizens’ beliefs and practices across multiple domains” (30). So, to escape this anxiety, he appropriates Locke, “the principle is ‘political, not metaphysical”(30). In order to advance the point, he cites examples where discrimination obviously leads to a group being treated as second-class - he does not need to convince anyone why slavery, discr...

Viewpoint Neutrality

Brettschneider characterizes his view as preserving "the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality in the protection of free speech rights, while rejecting viewpoint neutrality in state speech." (9) The state thus has to be neutral among the viewpoints that it protects, regardless of how hateful they might be, but it also has an obligation to attempt to persuade those who express viewpoints that conflict with the "ideal of freedom and equality for all citizens," (9), hence not to be viewpoint neutral in its advocacy of these ideals and in its reasoned opposition to views that conflict with them. George Bush was thus right both to protect the Klan's right to express its views, but also to condemn the views that it expresses as fundamentally at odds with the a liberal society's commitment to the freedom and equality of its citizens. Consider how complicated this line can get. Many people have argued that they should be able to put hateful speech on their vanity lic...

Gero - Blog Post 8

In Chapter 1 of When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? , Brettschneider discusses the unspoken expressive ways that the state can use “to defend the core values” (page 45). Brettschneider proposes funding, formal education, and public holidays as examples of unspoken expressive state speech that can be used to promote equal freedom and citizenship. I think an important aspect of unspoken expressive state speech that Brettschneider failed to consider was public symbols or monuments. In using democratic persuasion to promote freedom and equality for all citizens, the government must actively remove monuments or symbols that oppose these values as well educate the citizenry of their significance. For example, monuments to Confederate war heroes, racist colonial statues, and the Confederate flag are all in opposition to the core values of freedom and...

Krasemann - Blog Post 8

In the introduction of When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, Corey Brettschneider considers the persuasive role the state ought to play in facilitating the protection of rights. He believes that the state “expresses itself to defend the very values that underlie rights, including freedom of expression and religion” (7). I am interested in considering what role ordinary citizen’s play in the facilitation of the protection of rights, if at all. Brettschneider makes clear that “ I suggest that we distinguish between a state’s coercive power, or its ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and its expressive power, or its ability to influence beliefs and behavior by “speaking” to hate groups and the larger society.” (3). The state should criticize hateful views. It should act in a manner that does not restrict freedom of expression, but rather encourages individuals and groups to act under legitimate law. While the state has this role, what ro...

Miller - Blog Post 8

In Chapter 1 of “When the State Speaks, What Should it Say?” Brettschneider emphasizes the value of free and equal citizenship. He explains that in accordance with value democracy, “citizens must be treated as having equal status in that the rights of all citizens must be equally respected” and, fundamentally, “all citizens have equal status under law” (31). He places particular emphasis on the idea of what citizenship entails in a legitimate state: the state has a role in ensuring that citizens are free, equal, and never second-class. In addition, in accordance with the principle of public relevance brought up by Brettschneider, citizens must themselves “adopt the ideal of free and equal citizenship and change their discriminatory beliefs and practices which conflict with democratic values” (37). While Brettschneider does not believe that the state can censor hate speech that espouses ideas that are in conflict with free and equal citizensh...

Spangler Blog Post 8

In Chapter 1 of When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? , Brettschneider outlines the two guiding ideals value democracy, these ideals being the principle of public relevance and democratic persuasion. The principle of public relevance claims that “personal beliefs and actions should be in accordance with public values to the extent that private life affects the ability of citizens to function in a society and see others as free and equal citizens,” (29). The reason for rights must be defended through state expression, and the areas in which this expression is legitimate and needed are justified by the principle of public relevance. In addressing this principle, he considers the common special analogy of the public and private ‘spheres.’ He claims that this metaphor is flawed because it claims that there are areas, like the private sphere, in which the state has neither the obligation nor authority to act (27). This is an important point because it is often claimed that a we...

Fish- Blog Post 8

Brettschneider in his introduction argues for an account of value democracy. In so doing, Brettschneider discusses what rights individuals have when it comes to hate speech and hate groups, discussing the paradox of rights. He writes that “Value democracy shares much with the traditional feminist belief that the ‘personal is political’” (19). At the same time, he writes that “in the name of freedom and equality, liberalism shields groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazis, and chauvinists who threaten to undermine the very entitlement of women and minorities to free and equal status” (12). The “paradox of rights” he speaks to, while addressed, still seems to conflict in ways that are not reconciled with in these chapters. The primary consideration that Brettschneider seems to ignore is how hateful or discriminatory views and actions, regardless of how little they may be publicly expressed, impact the status of freedom and equality in other individuals. If the personal truly i...

Mehra - Blog Post 8