Kim Blog Post 9

    In chapter 3 of Democratic Rights, Brettschneider makes an argument for democratic contractualism "as an account of legitimate coercion of citizens, draws from the concern to assure that the rights of individuals are protected."(pg. 57) To do so he makes the distinction between three terms: persons, people and citizens. 

    Persons are individuals as they are: "defined by their distinct understandings of their own wills" (pg. 57) Persons are not tied to the core values of equality and can treat one another in an inegalitarian manner. People are defined as a community in which members treat one another in accordance with the three core values of democracy. Citizens are individual members of the 'people' who treat other members in accordance with the three core values. He describes citizenship as an "ideal relevant to democratic coercion" and "limited to theorizing about politics and legitimate coercion." (pg. 58) He makes the argument that such an ideal only requires personal beliefs to be "bracketed in thinking about how the state should act." (pg. 58)  In separating persons and citizens, he makes an argument for how persons are to bracket their beliefs to act as citizens. 

    This view led me back to the argument I made in my previous blog post and the arguments that he makes in  Chapter 1 of When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? Brettschneider, in making an argument for value democracy, makes the argument that the state should criticize beliefs that are inegalitarian. Yet if people are able to separate themselves as persons and as citizens, would that criticism be necessary? I give the example of religion and how in some cases it is very difficult to take out illiberal beliefs from religion. By criticizing illiberal beliefs, it is very possible to end up having a stance against a particular religion. Yet, this seems to be spilling into the boundaries of personhood. Is it possible to persuade people to be good citizens without necessarily criticizing them as persons? 

    A good judge would be able to separate between persons and citizens. This seems to be what we assume about current judges in the justice system. A judge as a person could be very religious and thus may hold some misogynistic views. However, performing the role of a judge he could bracket such beliefs. In other words, an individual judge could be very inegalitarian as a person, but egalitarian as a citizen. If so is it necessary to criticize the person, or would it be sufficient to persuade people to be good citizens in certain contexts? 

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