PPECMC2021CovidCrusaders

In Unstrapping the Straitjacket of Preference , Elizabeth Anderson unpacks Sen’s critique of preference and the multiple purposes it serves actually show that preference is not simply one ‘dogma’ which economists can use to solve all their problems. The three purposes of preference that Sen identifies are “a) to describe a person's choices; b) to represent whatever motives underlie a person’s choices; and c) to represent a person’s welfare,” (22). He claims that these are actually three different things: choice, underlying motive, and welfare. Further, he argues that people often choose to act in ways that do not maximize their preferences on the basis of what he calls ‘commitment.’ This idea of commitment is best described as counter-preferential choice because it is when people act on principle as opposed to preference. This action is still rational, despite not advancing the preferences of the individual because it is based on socially and ethically desirable principles (24). ...

In Elizabeth Anderson’s essay “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” she adds to Amartya Sen’s argument for raising suspicion against the concept of economic preferences that define rational human choices as ones that advance an individual’s welfare. This stems from a misunderstanding that people’s preferences always align with advancing themselves: “Preference conceived as a choice or motive fails to do so, because people have motives wide than and sometimes even counter to their self-interests, and often choose accordingly” (23). Instead of framing people’s choices as individual, self-interested ones, Anderson proposes the idea of “collective agency.” She maintains that if people can identify a problem that can be resolved by joining forces, then they rationally and morally should, and this “Practical identification with others does not require any prior acquaintance or relationship” (31). In fact, two complete strangers can find an association with one another that “would...

  In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson extends arguments made by Amartya Sen to provide a theory for the rationality of committed action. Anderson swiftly walks the reader through an argument that begins with addressing problems in the reasonings provided for outcomes in the prisoners’ dilemma, develops and tests a new theory through various examples and case studies, and is able to extend the argument to as grand of claims as expanding the “community of identity to the whole of humanity” and finding the point where “rationality coincides with morality” (37). In her argument, the decisions made by the individuals in the prisoners’ dilemma would be based on their ability to see themselves as common members of a social group and rephrase their question to “What should we do?” (28). However Anderson moves beyond this conclusion to a driving factor for individuals to be capable of seeing themselves as common members that “depends on a prior determinat...

It is interesting to consider Anderson’s comments on voting within the context of other social issues, namely climate change. But I think a very similar argument could be made for not eating meat. Anderson places importance on identity derived from a group. This group identity makes it easier to explain behavior that is not utility-maximizing but is socially and morally intuitive. Anderson’s case in point is voting. Anderson shows that there is no reason to value voting if you want to maximize your utility. This is uncontroversial. One individual vote does not really matter, making the time required to cast that vote meaningless under consequentialism. Of course then, this criticism carries into altruistic views as well. If a vote has zero sum, then standing in line and filling out your ballot is not act-consequential, and one could spend that time doing more altruistic activities. Unfortunately, voting takes some portion of time so “there is always some inconvenience. So I ought not t...

  In discussing Sen’s argument on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, Anderson asserts that “it is hardly foolish to not prefer the act of cooperation in itself, apart from its consequences” (page 27). She demonstrates this by providing the example of voting for a preferred consequence, not merely just for the act of voting (Anderson, 26). While Anderson may be correct in arguing that in some situations the consequences of cooperation are preferable to the act of cooperation, there is still an intrinsic value in cooperation.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith discusses the various passions which evoke sympathy or resentment from the indifferent spectator. Smith would likely categorize cooperation as a social passion which “when expressed in the countenance or behavior even towards those who are not particularly connected to ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occasion” (Smith, 36). Cooperation as a “social and benevolent affection,...

In her paper, Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference’, Elizabeth Anderson elaborates on Amartya Sen’s contributions to philosophy and economics. Anderson focuses much of her essay on the idea that it is disingenuous and blatantly lazy (this feels a little more implied than stated in her paper) to attribute economic choices and rationality to a set of preferences that boil down to nothing more than utility. Anderson argues that following from Sen, it is not always utility and preference in the broad sense that determine a person’s actions or choices. Many other factors play into the unquestioned dogma of economic preferences, and Anderson elaborates on mostly one. She begins her argument by extending the prisoner’s dilemma, adding in ideas that seem very class conscious Marx-esque. Marxist theory, however, is not what I hope to develop. Anderson overcomes the inadequacies of rational-choice economic theory by creating her concept of committed action. Anderson defines committe...

  In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson explores collective action problems in the prisoner’s dilemma. In conceptualizing the prisoner’s dilemma, Anderson explores “solutions” to the problem; situations in which collective action succeeds and cooperation ensues. In this prisoner dilemma, a solution would entail the prisoners collaborating to both get less time rather than ratting the other out.  The use of the word “solution” here raises interesting questions. To me, “solution” implies solving a problem; here, while the prisoners may be solving their problem, the general society may not be. In fact, society at large may have a new problem on its hands if guilty prisoners undermine the justice system by cooperating to lighten the sentences they deserve. Anderson acknowledges this issue when she writes that “not all committed action is desirable from a moral point of view. Recall that the original setting for the prisoner's dilemma involves two ...

In her comments, Elizabeth Anderson expands on Sen’s suggestion that shared identities can build a rational basis for cooperation in collective action problems. If individuals regard themselves as members of a single collective agency, they will ask themselves “What should we do?” instead of “What should I do?”. As Anderson says, “Insofar as I identify with the group, my reason for acting is: to do my part in advancing what we are willing together.” (Anderson 30). While Anderson does not deny the validity of utility maximizing views, she claims that the guiding principles of rational choice will depend on a prior determination of identity.   Anderson’s argument for the importance of identity in facilitating cooperation aligns with many of the underlying principles of group evolutionary theory. Many evolutionary theories aim to explain why humans have uniquely evolved to cooperate in large groups with members. In Jonathan Haidt’s book, The Righteous Mind , (my favorite book bt...

  In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference;’ a Comment on Amartya Sen’s Contributions to Philosophy and Economics”, Elizabeth Anderson expands Sen’s suspicion of ‘preference’ as the function of rational decision making. In attempting to fill Sen’s lacuna regarding rational judgments and building off his prior work, Anderson puts forth “ The Priority of Identity to Rational Principle : what principle of choice it is rational to act on depends on a prior determination of personal identity, of who one is” (30). Identity advances the force of collective agency. According to Anderson, “In taking up the perspective of collective agency, the parties to an n-person prisoner’s dilemma can see their actions as jointly advancing a desirable goal even though none of their actions taken in isolation has a positive marginal impact on that goal” (30). Identity with part of a group compels them to take membership in collective action and advance shared goals. Identity is messy, nuanced, a...

 Thought this was a fascinating (and distressing) timely intersection of many of the topics we have been discussing, including juvenile justice and bright lines, as well as stare decisis/precedent and even a bit of textualism: https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/23/opinions/supreme-court-kavanaugh-sotomayor-jones-mississippi-williams/index.html

  ACTIVITY 1: INDIA VS. CHINA (20 min) “The Lee Thesis,” originally attributed to the former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, maintains that harsher political systems — ones that deny some basic civil liberties and political rights — are worth having for promoting economic development. While there is little evidence to show this is definitely true, civil liberties and political rights do not always have a direct relationship with economic development, though. Compare India and China. To give some background, China has a higher standard of living, but India has more robust political liberties.  China has a GDP of 14.34 USD vs. India has a GDP of 2.87 USD.  China's life expectancy is 73.5 vs. India's life expectancy is 64.4.  China’s literacy rate is 96.8% vs. India’s literacy rate is 77.7%...  HOWEVER, China essentially has a dictatorship (Constitution change that made Xi president for life in 2019) vs. India has the largest democracy in the world. ...

In Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen argues against the standard approach to development that most economists uphold — one that emphasizes economic measures of development (GDP, income) as the primary measure of development as a whole. Instead of focusing primarily on economic development, Sen argues that it is crucial to consider several components of freedom to measure development. One of the components that Sen focuses on is ensuring political freedoms in the form of democracy. In fact, he highlights that there has never been a “substantial famine… in a democratic country — no matter how poor” (51). Sen’s argument strongly urges against “the need for resources (which) is frequently presented as an argument for postponing socially important investments until a country is already richer” (47).  While arguing for democracy as a crucial aspect of measuring development is a persuasive one, Sen’s argument suffers from lacking a definition of what he means by democracy. Does he argu...

  In chapter one of Development as Freedom , Sen introduces the idea that freedom should encapsulate both processes and opportunities, because “unfreedom can arise either through inadequate processes (such as the violation of voting privileges or other political or civil rights) or through inadequate opportunities that some people have for achieving what they minimally would like to achieve” (17). This produces a broader definition of freedom, and Sen seems to build on the idea of freedom as processes and opportunities in Chapter 2, with his further distinction that the “expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development” (36). Expanding freedom is both the goal and plays instrumental roles in this because of how different freedoms relate to each other.  This discussion of ends and means reminds me of Smith’s discussion of efficient causes, final causes, and purpose, and I wonder how that would fit in here. Smith argued that w...

     Sen attempts to discredit the common thought that personal freedoms are typically privileges unique to wealthy nations - “The real problem here … the underlying-and often unargued-belief that has been dominant in some policy circles that human development is really a kind of luxury that only richer countries can afford” (143). His evidence to support this claim is the economies of East Asian countries, which he thinks “went comparatively early for massive expansion of education ... before they broke the restraints of general poverty” (143). Sen specifically mentions Meiji Japan. It is impossible not to think of China in a discussion about the expansion of East-Asian economies. In both cases, Meiji Japan and China under Deng, the picture of individual freedoms in relation to economic development is not as simple as Sen makes it seem.      This is clear when looking at various restrictions in China. Chinese televisions still only broadcast a select few g...

  In chapter two of his work, Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen develops nuances in the relationship between various factors we commonly hear about, such as GDP and life expectancy and the broader term of development. He delineates certain interconnected and core rights as paramount to growth. These include political freedoms, economic freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. He develops the importance of all of these freedoms and their impact on health outcomes. Sen’s adamance about the importance of freedom of life through public and private healthcare, while correct, lacks a fundamental connection to the broader spectrum of scientific and medical research. I do not point this out to devalue Sen’s theory of interconnectedness but to provide an additional perspective to the incentivization of social freedom to health. Later I will describe my contentions with the India-China example of democratic health outcomes.  The development...

   In chapter three of Development As Freedom, Sen makes an argument for a freedom based development of nations. The substantive freedoms that he argues for are interconnected in that together they allow for a direction vector given various inputs and weights to point towards the direction that individuals in the nation should have. In particular, his account of development as freedom is distinct from Rawls in that he does not espouse for the absolute priority of liberty that Rawls does. He notes the weaknesses in other theories and then presents his own. Utilitarianism: focuses on the outcomes and therefore ignores intrinsic values of rights and liberties. Libertarianism: focuses on procedural rights but has flaws in that it completely ignores outcomes. Interconnected freedoms Vs. Rawls: liberty should not be given a priority but merely one of the substantive or instrumental freedoms to be taken into consideration.  He argues that the flaw of "priority of liberty" d...

In the beginning of Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen brings up survival rates in his discussion of freedom. In the first chapter, he concentrates on “very elementary freedom: the ability to survive rather than succumb to premature mortality” (24). Sen talks about survival rates in various countries and compares them to black males in the United States. The black males have the lowest survival rates of the four populations he considers: U.S. white males, Chinese males, Kerala (India) males, and U.S. black males. This indicates that “American blacks suffer from relative deprivation in terms of income per head vis-à-vis American whites” (22). Compared to American whites, American blacks appear impoverished. Not only that, but the American blacks have generally much higher incomes than the Indians and Chinese males who outlive them.   Sen’s point introduces interesting concepts of freedom and happiness. It seems clear that most people wish to live as long as possible, and that...

In Development as Freedom , Sen makes the argument that implementing instrumental freedoms will catalyze development. These freedoms all work to help the average citizen and improve quality of life. I think this argument is especially interesting in the context of the protests in India against the recently passed Farm Acts. This legislation lifts some of the protections traditionally upheld for Indian farmers and increases economic freedom. For reference, over 700 million people in India (51% of the population) earn income from agriculture, and it's estimated that 250 million have participated in union strikes over the past year ( NPR ). Many have argued that the farming population in India is too large for so drastic of a reform. While most farmers were already living at subsistence, they fear that without government price supports, wholesale markets, or guaranteed buyers, they will be plunged even further into poverty. Furthermore, any gains made in a free market would concentrat...

The standard approach to development, at least until recently, is focused entirely upon what Sen characterizes as "economic facilities," valuing them only instrumentally, and the approach measures them by some standard metric, such as per capita income or per capita GDP. Sen, by contrast, sees economic facilities as just one among an interconnected set of freedoms, and takes it appropriately to be valued both instrumentally and intrinsically.  Markets and trade are a means to expanding substantive freedoms (instrumental), but they are also intrinsically valuable.  It is a substantive, intrinsically valuable freedom to be capable of trading in markets.  When segregation bans certain groups from markets, or women are banned from certain markets, or are harassed when they participate in them, they are being denied a substantive freedom of intrinsic value. So economists typically fail to appreciate that markets are not just instrumentally valuable, as tools for maximizing pre...

In Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen identifies five types of instrumental freedoms: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (Sen 38). In explaining these instruments of freedom, he writes that “These instrumental freedoms tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, but they also serve to complement one another” (Sen 38). While to an extent each instrument holds profound importance, I believe that political freedom is distinctly crucial for social stability. Looking at someone like Smith, who argues quite directly that “Justice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support, seems, in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and daring care of nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms,” it is hard to see how other freedoms can hold up to political fre...

       In Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen argues that freedom is both the means and the ends of development. He posits that rather than focusing on economic growth or social progress independently, it is important to consider a variety of factors-- a wider “information base”-- to measure development. Specifically, Sen puts forth the idea of capability such that we should measure development by the capability of people “to choose a life that one has reason to value” (74). Greater freedom and capability empowers individual agents to achieve their objectives. Sen clarifies his definition of capability through the concepts of functionings and achievements. According to Sen, “the concept of ‘functionings’ . . . reflects the various things a person may value doing or being” (75). A person’s capability determines his or her ability to choose various functioning combinations; capability is the freedom to choose a lifestyle. To illustrate this relationship, Sen writes “a...