Interconnections of Freedoms
The standard approach to development, at least until recently, is focused entirely upon what Sen characterizes as "economic facilities," valuing them only instrumentally, and the approach measures them by some standard metric, such as per capita income or per capita GDP.
Sen, by contrast, sees economic facilities as just one among an interconnected set of freedoms, and takes it appropriately to be valued both instrumentally and intrinsically. Markets and trade are a means to expanding substantive freedoms (instrumental), but they are also intrinsically valuable. It is a substantive, intrinsically valuable freedom to be capable of trading in markets. When segregation bans certain groups from markets, or women are banned from certain markets, or are harassed when they participate in them, they are being denied a substantive freedom of intrinsic value.
So economists typically fail to appreciate that markets are not just instrumentally valuable, as tools for maximizing preference satisfaction, but that the capability to transact in markets is intrinsically valuable, and denied to many people around the world on a regular basis.
Crucially, though, Sen believes that his fellow economists also fail to appreciate that economic facilities are just one freedom among others with which it is interconnected, including political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. (e.g., p. 38) If political liberties are absent, and governments are corrupt, no amount of money pumped into markets will foster development -- it will all be syphoned away through corruption. If substantive freedom to obtain education and maintain basic health is lacking, agents are crippled in their ability to participate in markets. Without transparency, agents do not have the information they need either to function in markets or to engender democratic accountability. Such freedoms are thus, Sen argues, all interconnected, and lack of some prevents expansion of others. An understanding of the interconnections among such freedoms is thus the key to fostering real development, and it is also the end of development. To have substantive freedoms is to be capable of living the life that one has reason to value (10); such capability is the proper goal of any society, regardless of its level of advancement along various dimension. Increasing such capabilities, such substantive freedoms, is development.
It is interesting to compare and contrast this alternative picture of freedom, freedom as substantive capability to pursue what we have reason to value, with other alternative accounts of freedom and liberty that we have encountered. Sen suggests a framework for such comparisons in ch. 3, through appeal to the different informational bases of alternative theories. Utilitarianism is right to focus on well-being and on outcomes, but wrong to do so to the exclusion an appreciation of the intrinsic value of rights, processes, and liberty. Libertarianism is right to focus on procedural rights, but wrong to do so to the exclusion of results and of substantive freedoms and opportunities. It is interesting to ask how other accounts, such as Ripstein's and Posner's, fit in to Sen's framework for comparison. It is also interesting that the alternative that Sen takes most seriously as a contender against his capability account is Rawls' own theory of justice, with its emphasis on the priority of liberty and on other primary goods (opportunity, wealth and income, self-respect).
Comments
What is so fascinating about Sen’s account is how instrumental freedoms interact, and how they are linked. As Sen explains, “the effectiveness of freedom as an instrument lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types” (37). I think a timely illustration of this involves the legalization of marijuana. One could argue that legalizing marijuana involves the instrumental freedom of “economic facilities.” After all, the issue of marijuana legalization affects the “the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption … and exchange” (39). It is important to acknowledge that the instrumental freedom, “economic facilities,” is disproportionately infringed upon for Black citizens, who are arrested for marijuana use and sale at disproportionate rates. Thus the overall freedoms of Black citizens are infringed upon disproportionately.
And yet, I believe the issue of marijuana legalization touches upon another instrumental freedom: political freedom. Since the sale of marijuana can potentially lead to a felony charge, which can result in the loss of one’s ability to vote, the criminalization of marijuana impacts the ability of sellers to use their political freedoms to “determine who should govern” (38). Here economic facilities and political freedoms are interrelated, which illustrates how instrumental freedoms often connect. In this case freedom of one type (economic facilities) advances freedom of other types (political freedoms).
This example illustrates the importance of recognizing the interconnectedness of freedoms. We may think we have political freedoms in America, as they are protected in the 15th Amendment which states that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Yet it is important to question whether the instrumental freedom of economic facilities, which are limited by the federal criminalization of marijuana, impedes the political freedoms of felons. Since the decriminalization of marijuana would seemingly strengthen two instrumental freedoms in America, economic facilities and political freedoms, would legalization constitute development under Sen’s framework?