Mehra - Blog Post "Lucky Number 13"
In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference;’ a Comment on Amartya Sen’s Contributions to Philosophy and Economics”, Elizabeth Anderson expands Sen’s suspicion of ‘preference’ as the function of rational decision making. In attempting to fill Sen’s lacuna regarding rational judgments and building off his prior work, Anderson puts forth “The Priority of Identity to Rational Principle: what principle of choice it is rational to act on depends on a prior determination of personal identity, of who one is” (30). Identity advances the force of collective agency. According to Anderson, “In taking up the perspective of collective agency, the parties to an n-person prisoner’s dilemma can see their actions as jointly advancing a desirable goal even though none of their actions taken in isolation has a positive marginal impact on that goal” (30). Identity with part of a group compels them to take membership in collective action and advance shared goals.
Identity is messy, nuanced, and complicated. More than anything, it is strong. It can forge unspoken bonds between people who have never met. To that end, I think it is worth considering how identity can be both a unifying and divisive force. Both of these considerations raise questions about Anderson’s argument.
First, consider how iterated games of the prisoner’s dilemma challenge Anderson’s notion of prisoner commitment to acting together. The scenario she puts forth is that “parties to a prisoner’s dilemma identify with one another as common members of a social group,” and accordingly, ask “what should we do?” Surely not everyone who shares a social identity would forge a “joint strategy”-- Anderson herself concedes this. She is sure to argue that her argument “does not require that we act on our ascribed social identities of gender, race, caste, ethnicity . . . The concept of identity at stake in the theory of rationality is practical, not ascriptive” (30-31). It is nonetheless curious to consider how fragile this “joint strategy by identity” argument it is in iterated games. For example, assume two people in the prisoner’s dilemma share identity X. Identity X is very influential and makes both prisoners compelled to cooperate. In the first nine games, they might, but imagine in the tenth game, they do not. One prisoner throws the other under the bus.
In most prisoner’s dilemma situations, this would be most inconsequential in the long term. But with identity as a driving force, I would contend that after one “betrayal,” individuals sharing identity X would be less likely to trust each other-- they feel they cannot even trust their own blood (or whatever the defining factor of identity X is). So, just as easily as identity can be a force for collaboration and commitment, it can be a force for meaningful, offensive distrust that undermines this collaboration widely and long-term.
Second, I want to more broadly consider what defines identity, and how different identities can intersect to complicate the concept of collective agency. Identity can be something that Anderson mentions, like race or religion. But I would contend it can also be something that is seemingly more trivial and impermanent, like being a prisoner or an accused person. The question is, how do these different identities interact? How do we discern which identities are strongest in determining rational action? Also, are shared identities ever completely undermined by conflicting ones? Imagine A and B share identity X, but A also holds identity Y, which is at odds with identity Z, which B holds. How can we determine the relative strength of the unity versus the division? And who gets to decide which choice would be “rational” in this case?
Though neither of these examples-- identity and negativity and conflicting identities-- directly undermine Anderson’s argument, I find it valuable to question how her argument would function when applied.
Comments
In Anderson’s discussion of gender roles, she asserts that “individuality . . . emerges out of a certain kind of social order” (36). Particularly when it comes to gender roles in more traditional societies that Anderson addresses, men get to choose the identity related to their career; women have the identity of mother and housewife. Often, we as individuals do not choose our identities but are naturally brought up with them.
When it comes to how our identities affect us, I believe Anderson would disagree with you that certain identities can “undermine” others or even that some identities directly clash. She writes that “we do not have to choose between these two dismal options, of rational egoism or commitment to an unjust form of group agency” (35). Instead, we are stuck somewhere in the middle, with our identities indirectly influencing who we are, how we act, and what decisions we make. An important question Anderson poses is “In what contexts is it rational to identify with others, or, on the other hand, to conceive oneself as an independent agent” (32). The problem is, we never really get to decide.
Because we all hold distinct intersectional identities that are unique to only us, we are always acting as our own agent. To an extent we certainly are influenced by our identities, but because of how they converge and connect internally, we all are shaped differently. Even if individuals hold the same identities, the way those identities impact the self are inevitably different person to person. As important as identities are in decision making, because of the intersectional nature of identity and, often, the lack of choice involved, we always act as our own individual agents with our own identities. Not conforming to an identity how someone else would should not be viewed as “betrayal,” but should merely be understood as a reflection of difference.
You mention that it could be that after playing nine games of the prisoner's dilemma that involve cooperation, the tenth game could involve backstabbing. This undermines the trust the two individuals from the same group put in each other. I would like to consider the alternative. Perhaps at first, the individuals betray each other, but after nine games they come to terms with their shared identity and agree to cooperate from then on out.
In terms of rationality, this case could make sense. It can be difficult to immediately identify with and trust someone, even if they are a member of the same group. Considering the prisoner's dilemma, there may be initial distrust, but after acknowledging each other's similarities, there can be room for cooperation. Rationality may involve skepticism at first. However, after a while, skepticism makes room for comfort and trust, as it would in this situation of the prisoner's dilemma. It may not take 9 games of mistrust to achieve cooperation. It could take as little as 1 or 2 with another member of the same identity and group.