Miller Blog Post 13

 In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson explores collective action problems in the prisoner’s dilemma. In conceptualizing the prisoner’s dilemma, Anderson explores “solutions” to the problem; situations in which collective action succeeds and cooperation ensues. In this prisoner dilemma, a solution would entail the prisoners collaborating to both get less time rather than ratting the other out. 

The use of the word “solution” here raises interesting questions. To me, “solution” implies solving a problem; here, while the prisoners may be solving their problem, the general society may not be. In fact, society at large may have a new problem on its hands if guilty prisoners undermine the justice system by cooperating to lighten the sentences they deserve. Anderson acknowledges this issue when she writes that “not all committed action is desirable from a moral point of view. Recall that the original setting for the prisoner's dilemma involves two presumably guilty co-conspirators who have an interest in getting away with their crime … from a moral point of view, it would be better if either or both confessed to their crimes” (24). Thus, finding a “solution” to the prisoner's dilemma seems to in turn raise a new moral problem.

From this analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma, it becomes clear that not all “committed action is desirable from a moral point of view” (31). In some cases, solving the collective action problem leads to immoral ends. But in other cases, it seems as though solving the collective action problem could involve immoral means. Consider if the two criminals were separately asked if the other had committed the crime; to solve the collective action problem they would deny the other's illicit acts, thus lying. As we read in Shiffrin, lying in such a manner would be immoral in and of itself, whether or not it resulted in an immoral end (the criminals getting released from jail early). 

 Anderson provides a response to this issue of immoral cooperation, as she explores how to go from rationality to the morality of committed action. She explains that “if it would be rational for a collective encompassing all of humanity to adopt a certain principle of committed action, then action on that principle is morally right” (25). This seems to set a constraint on collaboration. If some instance of collaboration would not be rational if it was instituted as a maxim for all, then it is immoral. This gives a guide to how persons could permissibly collaborate and “solve” collective action problems in a society. 


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Gero - Final Farewell Blog Post Fifteen

Mehra - Blog Post "Lucky Number 13"

Discussion Leader Sign Up