Simionas Blog Post "Lucky Number 13"

 In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson extends arguments made by Amartya Sen to provide a theory for the rationality of committed action. Anderson swiftly walks the reader through an argument that begins with addressing problems in the reasonings provided for outcomes in the prisoners’ dilemma, develops and tests a new theory through various examples and case studies, and is able to extend the argument to as grand of claims as expanding the “community of identity to the whole of humanity” and finding the point where “rationality coincides with morality” (37). In her argument, the decisions made by the individuals in the prisoners’ dilemma would be based on their ability to see themselves as common members of a social group and rephrase their question to “What should we do?” (28). However Anderson moves beyond this conclusion to a driving factor for individuals to be capable of seeing themselves as common members that “depends on a prior determination of personal identity” (30). Then, through her case study Anderson argues that the development of an individual identity relies on being part of many social circles that do not “define anyone’s agency,” and is then “authorized to adjudicate the conflicts among its various constitutive collective identities” (35). 

At all different points in her argument, Anderson’s conclusions seem to provide solutions that can apply to issues we have previously discussed, for instance her definition of identity can provide guidance on the amount of control parents can have over the influences their child is exposed to. In our discussion with Shiffrin regarding the right to public education, she argued that children should have the right to have influences in their lives not chosen by their parents. It seems that this would be expanding the social circles they would be a part of, and counteract problems like Anderson points out in the case study on womens’ individuality and what happened when their social spheres were confined and later expanded. 

Anderson also concedes in her argument that “the principle of expected utility and the principle of group universalizability are, on the view I have developed so far, both conditionally valid,” based on an individual’s identity (31). I wonder if this concession, when translated to the issue of social groups seeing themselves as part of the ‘social union of social unions,’” is more problematic or prevalent than Anderson’s presentation may make it seem (37). I also question how it relates to popular understandings of our right to association, and within that our rights to not associate. If there are individuals who cannot transition from “I” to “we” as needed in Anderson’s argument, then couldn’t we imagine a collection of individuals who could do the same thing, and limit the “we” they are able to include? While I do not disagree with her that part of the value in getting past these limitations is that it will be a “historically urgent task,” it seems that current practices are proving that many populations are not convinced by this. Whether it be political gridlock in the U.S, the debate over covid vaccine patents at the cost of lives in other countries, issues such as the Boy Scout example from Shiffrin, and more we often see personal preferences used as a wall to stop considering the needs of groups people do not want to associate with. It seems that the next extension of Anderson’s argument would have to deal with the large, yet briefly touched on at the end of the reading, constraints on preferences that this would present. I could see a minimum level of social cooperation to all human beings, and from that between groups of them, be conceived of as a human rights definition. Additionally, tools that both Sen and Anderson have touched upon, specifically discussion, would be vital in promoting this social cooperation, developing the expectations of it, and understanding how it weighs against the preferences it would constrain.