ivashkiv blog 12

    Sen attempts to discredit the common thought that personal freedoms are typically privileges unique to wealthy nations - “The real problem here … the underlying-and often unargued-belief that has been dominant in some policy circles that human development is really a kind of luxury that only richer countries can afford” (143). His evidence to support this claim is the economies of East Asian countries, which he thinks “went comparatively early for massive expansion of education ... before they broke the restraints of general poverty” (143). Sen specifically mentions Meiji Japan. It is impossible not to think of China in a discussion about the expansion of East-Asian economies. In both cases, Meiji Japan and China under Deng, the picture of individual freedoms in relation to economic development is not as simple as Sen makes it seem.

    This is clear when looking at various restrictions in China. Chinese televisions still only broadcast a select few government-sponsored channels. Certain websites on computers are blocked. Deng’s government even sterilized women after giving birth to a second child. Sometimes, these methods of control turned violent. The Tiananmen Square Massacre is a case in point, in which Chinese forces murdered thousands of dissenters who protested for democratic rights. During the same time as these measures, China instituted economic policies that employed hundreds of millions of people. It is important to note that these policies were not enacted democratically. Meiji Japan did not prioritize personal freedom either. In the 1880s, the Japanese government completely revamped its political system in the larger effort to become more similar to European powers. The same is true for the Japanese military and economy. The whole point of the Meiji Restoration was for Japan to become like European powers. As a result, the culture became more westernized too. The oligarchs of that time did not prioritize personal freedom at all. Instead, the writers of the Meiji Constitution perceived a rapid replication of European countries as the best route to be considered a world power.

Instead, I think Sen should have relied on his argument from Chapter Two to show that prioritizing economic development over personal freedom makes it that much harder to usher in democratic reforms once that country has become richer. It seems like a high GDP would not compel a democracy, but rather that a high GDP would prevent a democracy from reverting to a more authoritarian type of government. I do not have an example for this, but I think it makes intuitive sense. An economically developed country will defend whatever form of government got the country to that place. Likewise, people will be less likely to criticize the authoritarian government that created a good economic outcome. So, in this way, not integrating personal freedoms into government initially runs the risk of creating a society that perpetually remains authoritarian. In Chapter Two, Sen relays his thesis that “is viewed as both (r) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development” (36). Given the phenomenon described above, it seems as though freedom cannot be the “primary end” if a combination of his five types of freedoms from Chapter Two is not used as the means.