Mehra - Blog Post 12
In Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen argues that freedom is both the means and the ends of development. He posits that rather than focusing on economic growth or social progress independently, it is important to consider a variety of factors-- a wider “information base”-- to measure development. Specifically, Sen puts forth the idea of capability such that we should measure development by the capability of people “to choose a life that one has reason to value” (74). Greater freedom and capability empowers individual agents to achieve their objectives.
Sen clarifies his definition of capability through the concepts of functionings and achievements. According to Sen, “the concept of ‘functionings’ . . . reflects the various things a person may value doing or being” (75). A person’s capability determines his or her ability to choose various functioning combinations; capability is the freedom to choose a lifestyle. To illustrate this relationship, Sen writes “an affluent person who fasts may have the same functioning achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute person who is forced to starve, but he first person does have a different ‘capability set’” (75).
It is interesting to note that in putting forth the capability argument, Sen is focusing on “the substantive freedom of individuals involved” (85). Each person, as an individual, is working towards his or her own definition of well-being through the freedoms that he or she is granted. Interests are not homogenous, and “heterogeneity of factors that influence individual advantage is a pervasive feature of our actual evaluation” (77). I would argue that the focus on individual (rather than societal) wellbeing could sometimes lead to a roadblock in achieving greater goals of development, especially when considering the influence of wealth on capability. This is especially pronounced considering the self-interested nature of individuals.
Enhanced capability for individuals means enhanced freedoms, including the freedom of speech, freedom to participate politically, freedom to earn income and participate in markets, and more. While these freedoms are undoubtedly advantageous and necessary in a liberal democracy at large, understanding the power they give to individuals is key. Consider an affluent individual who, as previously mentioned, has a different “set of capabilities” than a destitute individual. When exercising seemingly identical freedoms-- like the freedom to speak or vote-- the wealthy individual may have a greater capability to influence (through, say, donations and connections) the outcome. If the wealthy individual seeks to achieve greater wealth or protect their existing wealth, they may use their capabilities to influence policies that are at odds with the development of the whole.
For example, take Sen’s assertion that “The equity problems have to be addressed, especially in dealing with serious deprivations and poverty, and in that context, social intervention including governmental support may well have an important role” (120). In many cases, social intervention and governmental support can be linked to higher tax rates that the affluent may oppose. But their increased capability for influence may make them more “free to achieve” their policy preferences, overall potentially hindering development.
Here, it is interesting to consider Brettschneider’s value theory of democracy. The value theory of democracy offers robust freedoms and a fair procedure while also controlling the outcomes such that a more equitable voice for all is achieved. For example, a welfare system would be required under Brettschneider’s account. While it would theoretically be required under Sen’s, too, the lack of constraint and focus on individual capability may make it more difficult to achieve.
Comments
To address Tara’s concern, I believe that Sen might argue that it would depend on the freedoms that a particular society is striving for. Brettschneider’s account is obsessed with democratic legitimacy’s pre-conditional relation to true freedom, whereas Sen characterizes it as one of many factors to be considered when evaluating the process of expanding freedoms. When we consider a welfare system, under Brettschneider’s account it would be necessary, but I would argue that it would be more difficult to achieve under value democracy. In Brettschneider’s account, if 90% of the population thought that welfare was unjust, despite it being a legitimate goal of the democratic state, it could not be legitimately implemented, because of the narrow focus on exclusively democratic freedoms. Under Sen’s approach, welfare is not only justified by its democratic legitimacy, but also on its ability to be used by those who receive it.
Sen’s discussion of Smith’s criticism of the effects of “prodigals and projectors” (i.e., affluent individuals) on the economy (125). If the attitudes of a given society are those of prodigality, like the consumer-culture of the US, then it is likely that a welfare program will be less effective given the societal “passion for present enjoyment,” (125). I such a society it may be more advantageous to address issues of social opportunity so that it is more likely that the welfare will have a long-term effect on the individual’s freedoms. If there is no opportunity, then the individual freedom you highlighted as the focus of Sen’s account cannot be acted upon. However, immediately after this example, Sen highlights that it can be countered by the considering that our mutual interests tend to be promoted by transactions, seemingly rebutting his own point.
This leads directly into Sen’s “many-sided approach,” which is where I see the strength of his account over Brettschneider’s (126). The decision of when to implement welfare in a given society, on Sen’s view, depends on the way different freedoms are valued in that given society in tandem with issues that blight it. He uses the example of India and China, with India having superior democratic rights, China having superior social opportunities (127). It is clear that these states reflect the values of their populace; In India, the caste system still holds great sway over the populace, and China is communist. I believe that Sen would argue the state should attempt to advance freedoms that are in line with societal values first, as that is the most likely way to move forward in acquiring freedom. This leaves room for undemocratic freedoms to be appropriately valued, which is something that is lacking in Brettschneider’s account.
Great posts!