Simionas Blog Post 12

 In chapter one of Development as Freedom, Sen introduces the idea that freedom should encapsulate both processes and opportunities, because “unfreedom can arise either through inadequate processes (such as the violation of voting privileges or other political or civil rights) or through inadequate opportunities that some people have for achieving what they minimally would like to achieve” (17). This produces a broader definition of freedom, and Sen seems to build on the idea of freedom as processes and opportunities in Chapter 2, with his further distinction that the “expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development” (36). Expanding freedom is both the goal and plays instrumental roles in this because of how different freedoms relate to each other. 

This discussion of ends and means reminds me of Smith’s discussion of efficient causes, final causes, and purpose, and I wonder how that would fit in here. Smith argued that we too often equate efficient causes with purpose in our minds, when in examples like our blood circulating we so easily can see the difference between the two. I’m sure he’d find it rather interesting that Sen did not wrongly assess the means and ends of something as one in the same, but effectively separated the two and showed that freedom is playing both roles. Could freedom as an end and a mean translate to freedom as an efficient cause and a final cause or purpose in Smith’s terms? It seems that the instrumental role freedoms play in the development of other freedoms, the way they seem to naturally push each other forward, would be an efficient cause. And while Smith says efficient causes do not necessarily move towards the purpose we may assign them to, it seems that freedoms expanding other freedoms at least share commonalities in their purpose of expanding an individual’s freedoms even if the specific types of freedom are slightly different. It seems Sen’s characterization of individual freedom being a social product with a “two way relationship between (1) social arrangements to expand individual freedoms and (2) the use of individual freedoms not only to improve the respective lives but also to make the social arrangements more appropriate and effective” would present the same nuanced separating of causes and purposes that Smith asks for, while presenting one concept that is capable of being both. 

Another consideration with the relationship between Smith and Sen would be when Sen insists that valuation processes must be incredibly explicit, and left open to public debate and scrutiny (30). My question is, if Smith would be a proponent of this. Would he agree that how we choose to weigh different values and freedoms needs to be discussed explicitly or would he think that this arises from a natural process for humans to weigh values, that nature would effectively assign the weight to our various freedoms in our natural reactions and sympathies to others and ourselves that there would not need to be an organized, public debate organized by a government for this weight of different freedoms to be concluded upon.