Spangler Blog Post "Lucky Number 13"

In Unstrapping the Straitjacket of Preference, Elizabeth Anderson unpacks Sen’s critique of preference and the multiple purposes it serves actually show that preference is not simply one ‘dogma’ which economists can use to solve all their problems. The three purposes of preference that Sen identifies are “a) to describe a person's choices; b) to represent whatever motives underlie a person’s choices; and c) to represent a person’s welfare,” (22). He claims that these are actually three different things: choice, underlying motive, and welfare. Further, he argues that people often choose to act in ways that do not maximize their preferences on the basis of what he calls ‘commitment.’

This idea of commitment is best described as counter-preferential choice because it is when people act on principle as opposed to preference. This action is still rational, despite not advancing the preferences of the individual because it is based on socially and ethically desirable principles (24). To understand why this is rational, Anderson notes that one must devise a “non-preference based conception of reasons for action” and “robust conceptions of collective agency and individual identity,” (24). The core of the paper focuses on the understanding of identity and how it relates to the way people see themselves in relation to others.

Anderson takes identity to be “constituted by membership in various social groups,” (28). The idea of acting as an induvial (‘I’) as distinct from acting on the basis of the principles of a group (‘we’) is crucial to understanding this conception of identity. By acting on group principles as ‘we,’ we are “jointly committed to acting together” and our choice can be identified as a “single joint strategy”, (28). If the reasons for acting are not shared by the members of the group, then they cannot agree to it as a principled reason for action. The importance of discussion in this is highlighted, because as members of the ‘we,’ people need to be able to discuss why they feel their principles rationalize their actions so that they can decide on a common point of view from which they can then act as the group. She goes on to argue that individuality only emerges when there are “multiple distinct spheres of social life, none of which comprehensively defines anyone’s agency, individual freedom of mobility among those spheres, and individual membership in multiple spheres,” (36). These preconditions rely on a core understanding of one’s own identity, and how it affects their principles, such that rationality is “conditional on the agent’s self-conception, as an individual or a group member,” (31).

She notes that one cannot be all identities simultaneously because “social groups do not exist in pre-established harmony,” (36). One can have conflicting identities, and this can cause someone to act irrationally. It would seem that, in order to become a ‘better individual,’ one would need to actively adjudicate the conflicts of principle between the various identities one possesses and by doing so ensures that one’s method of rational thinking is free of cognitive dissonance. It is clear in this scenario, that rationality is entirely dictated by one’s knowledge of themself. In order to achieve rationality, you must understand the groups that you have been a part of over the course of your life, and how they have affected your thought processes. It borders on the Marxian notion of cause and effect, where individuals are a result of the circumstances (i.e. the groups they are surrounded by/joined not completely by choice). However, where Anderson differs is her belief that the individual can seek to rationalize their identity, and that ability requires self-knowledge because only then can the conscious choices about group membership hold value.