Fish- Blog Post 8
Brettschneider in his introduction argues for an account of value democracy. In so doing, Brettschneider discusses what rights individuals have when it comes to hate speech and hate groups, discussing the paradox of rights. He writes that “Value democracy shares much with the traditional feminist belief that the ‘personal is political’” (19). At the same time, he writes that “in the name of freedom and equality, liberalism shields groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazis, and chauvinists who threaten to undermine the very entitlement of women and minorities to free and equal status” (12). The “paradox of rights” he speaks to, while addressed, still seems to conflict in ways that are not reconciled with in these chapters.
The primary consideration that Brettschneider seems to ignore is how hateful or discriminatory views and actions, regardless of how little they may be publicly expressed, impact the status of freedom and equality in other individuals. If the personal truly is political, then this type of juxtaposition cannot exist under an account of value democracy. Again, Brettschneider does accept this to an extent by admitting that “This widespread private inequality inevitably results in political inequality,” but he does not seem to find a solution to this issue if private inequality in the form of discrimination is allowed to exist through value democracy’s protection of free speech (11). Brettschneider’s only true resolution is when he discusses the importance of non-neutrality in state speech: the state “should engage in democratic persuasion, supporting the ideal of freedom and equality for all citizens while criticizing hateful or discriminatory viewpoints” (9).
To Brettschneider, outside of hateful actions that are illegal for obvious reasons, the role of the state in merely “criticizing” hateful views seems to be enough for him. Yet there can clearly be a case made for how the criticizing of hate by the state does not go far enough. This sort of argument is widely applied throughout the world: consider Germany, where it is illegal to deny the Holocaust, which under Brettschneider’s account is an infringement on freedom of speech and would be undemocratic. Denying the Holocaust, at the same time, denies many marginalized groups and individuals of their history and their freedom to have that history respected. So, as Brettschneider himself argues, “This conflict between the ideals of liberal democracy and hateful viewpoints that deny free and equal citizenship cannot simply be defined away” (8).
The tension between Brettschneider’s acknowledgement of the complexity innate to the paradox of rights and his weak resolution poses an interesting problem: how can this issue really be addressed without completely infringing on free speech rights? Further, what “empirical situations” is Brettschneider considering where his account may not apply (18)? If criticism and even condemnation are not enough, but states should not have the authority to hear every private conversation, the easy yet unsatisfying answer does seem to be the resolution Brettschneider puts forth. Still, I am not completely convinced and wonder if, when it comes to views as horrific as those the KKK and Nazis hold, or Trump’s violations of the oath of office, that complete infringement on speech may actually be justified. In writing that “even if coercion proves more effective than democratic persuasion endorsed by value democracy, we should not simply favor the view that most effectively combats hateful viewpoints,” Brettschneider makes clear that value democracy prioritizes freedom more than the abolishment of hate and hate speech (18). Yet, if hateful views inhibit true freedom from being achieved as I have argued it does, then these two issues cannot be separated.
The primary consideration that Brettschneider seems to ignore is how hateful or discriminatory views and actions, regardless of how little they may be publicly expressed, impact the status of freedom and equality in other individuals. If the personal truly is political, then this type of juxtaposition cannot exist under an account of value democracy. Again, Brettschneider does accept this to an extent by admitting that “This widespread private inequality inevitably results in political inequality,” but he does not seem to find a solution to this issue if private inequality in the form of discrimination is allowed to exist through value democracy’s protection of free speech (11). Brettschneider’s only true resolution is when he discusses the importance of non-neutrality in state speech: the state “should engage in democratic persuasion, supporting the ideal of freedom and equality for all citizens while criticizing hateful or discriminatory viewpoints” (9).
To Brettschneider, outside of hateful actions that are illegal for obvious reasons, the role of the state in merely “criticizing” hateful views seems to be enough for him. Yet there can clearly be a case made for how the criticizing of hate by the state does not go far enough. This sort of argument is widely applied throughout the world: consider Germany, where it is illegal to deny the Holocaust, which under Brettschneider’s account is an infringement on freedom of speech and would be undemocratic. Denying the Holocaust, at the same time, denies many marginalized groups and individuals of their history and their freedom to have that history respected. So, as Brettschneider himself argues, “This conflict between the ideals of liberal democracy and hateful viewpoints that deny free and equal citizenship cannot simply be defined away” (8).
The tension between Brettschneider’s acknowledgement of the complexity innate to the paradox of rights and his weak resolution poses an interesting problem: how can this issue really be addressed without completely infringing on free speech rights? Further, what “empirical situations” is Brettschneider considering where his account may not apply (18)? If criticism and even condemnation are not enough, but states should not have the authority to hear every private conversation, the easy yet unsatisfying answer does seem to be the resolution Brettschneider puts forth. Still, I am not completely convinced and wonder if, when it comes to views as horrific as those the KKK and Nazis hold, or Trump’s violations of the oath of office, that complete infringement on speech may actually be justified. In writing that “even if coercion proves more effective than democratic persuasion endorsed by value democracy, we should not simply favor the view that most effectively combats hateful viewpoints,” Brettschneider makes clear that value democracy prioritizes freedom more than the abolishment of hate and hate speech (18). Yet, if hateful views inhibit true freedom from being achieved as I have argued it does, then these two issues cannot be separated.
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