Huang - Blog Post 8

In the introduction of “Averting Two Dystopias,” Corey Brettschneider outlines his main argument vouching for “value democracy” as opposed to a neutral or prohibitionist approach to rights protection, particularly concerning free speech. A neutralist viewpoint on neutrality is one that values free speech and rights to the extent that it seeks to protect all expressions of opinions, while a prohibitionist one uses coercive policies in an attempt to limit or even ban “hateful viewpoints.” Brettschneider defines “hateful viewpoints” as “opinions that are openly hostile to the core ideals of liberal democracy” (1). In contrast to these two main conceptions of handling “hateful viewpoints,” Brettschneider offers a third one: “value democracy,” which instead seeks to avoid the paradox of rights between the invasive state and the hateful society by engaging in democratic persuasion. The invasive state is a government that may violate some rights, limits freedom of speech, against illiberal values which is dangerous because in doing so the state must use illiberal values. On the other hand, the hateful society is one that protects liberal rights of free speech but in the process allows for the expression of a culture that opposes the rights, particularly equality. In order to avoid both of these dystopias, Brettschneider argues that the state should engage in democratic persuasion, which is not coercive, and condemn expressions that vouch for the infringement of a group’s rights. 

However, in doing so, Brettschneider does not explain how a government itself can always be on the just path or have the necessary liberal values to protect those freedoms. Brettschneider’s approach relies heavily on the government, people, or other actors to take the just stance against hateful viewpoints, but there is no vehicle for ensuring that. 

People who express hateful viewpoints “seek to bring about laws and policies that would deny the free and equal citizenship of racial, ethnic or religious minorities, women, or groups defined by their sexual orientation” (1). There are three points of contention here. First, Brettschneider’s definition itself is already an illustration of a failure to encompass all groups of people whose rights need to be protected against hateful viewpoints. This definition fails to include one of the most unprotected groups in the US and across the world: transexual people. (To clarify, though it should be obvious, sexual orientation is different from gender identity). Already Brettschneider creates an incomplete list of people who need to be protected against hate crimes and other discriminatory behavior, so in laying out a definition for who can be subject to hateful viewpoints, he highlights a problem with expecting any actor to comprehensively condemn a viewpoint that should be qualified as hateful. Second, the responsibility to decide when to use democratic persuasion is a significant one, even under circumstances when though defending the value of free and equal citizenship should be obvious. It should not be up to an individual’s discretion when a statement of condemnation is necessary. Instead, the basis of unjust speech should be codified in law. In fact, this is not a new concept. There are plenty of other examples of limiting free speech to set a precedent for this: yelling fire in a crowded room, libel and slander laws, copyright violations, child pornography etc. Third, even when it appears clear that a government should condemn a hateful viewpoint, depending on elected individuals, it will or will not be done. Under former President Trump, there were many instances in which it should have been obvious that a statement of condemnation was required — including when he “declined to condemn white supremacy— he failed to deliver. Relying on a government’s selected leadership is far too fragile and volatile to be a standard for protecting people from hateful viewpoints. 

The problem with Brettschneider’s approach is that rather than avoiding both the Hateful Society and the Invasive State, Brettschneider fails at completely protecting a state from either. Instead, relying on value democracy relies too heavily on governments, the education system, people, or other actors to speak against hateful speech under their individual discretion.