Ivashkiv Blog Post 9

It is interesting where Brettschneider draws the line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in punishment. In a fascinating tactic, Brettschneider chooses to argue against the practice of capital punishment on political grounds, not against the act of murder - “I attempt to argue against capital punishment from a political conception of the citizen” (108). I claim that a life sentence also violates “the political conception of the citizen.” Brettschneider addresses this concern, but not in its entirety. He responds that life in prison is different from capital punishment because of the ability to appeal. Judges can incorrectly cast someone as guilty. If that person is dead, then the person cannot demand a re-trial. The person sentenced to life in prison still has the right. 

It is not obvious why the person sentenced to life in jail has not been robbed of their political citizenship. This is true even in light of the privileges that Brettschneider wants to offer criminals, as Brettschneider defines “rights such as free speech, the right to vote and the right to live” as liberties that cannot be taken away via punishment (113). The idea that life in prison is worse than capital punishment is a common argument. People refer to this line of reasoning as the “other death penalty” or “the different death penalty.” These arguments mostly rely on moral claims. However, I think the arguments extend into the political sphere as well, considering rehabilitation can be political and not only moral. 

The right to vote and free speech do not comprise all of the ramifications of Brettschneider’s core values. So, anyone who is put in prison is restricted access to some of the privileges associated with the core values. Punishment is reserved for those who fail to embody the core values. Temporary sentences are a suspension from these rights. Life sentences are a permanent confiscation of these rights. Thus, life in prison without parole negates the possibility of rehabilitation. Not all guilty criminals outrightly reject the core values. Some might, but others simply do not act in accordance with the core values. This distinction is critical. The first case implies that the prisoner's understanding of the importance of the core values is impossible, while the second case does not. It is not reasonable to expect a judge to accurately decipher which criminals reject the core values and which ones do not act in accordance with them. In this way, Brettschneider’s complaint of the death penalty is similar to why it would be wrong to sentence someone to life in prison.

Why should we render rehabilitation impossible via life in prison for those who solely misrepresented the core values? If the core values should be prioritized by democracy, then would a blockade to realize these values be a violation of political rights?