Gero - Blog Post 9

        In Chapter 3 of Democratic Rights, Professor Brettschneider distinguishes between a legal and moral citizen. He defines moral citizens as “persons coerced by law who are entitled to be treated as sovereign in a manner that accords with the core values” (page 60). Unlike legal citizens, moral citizens are not granted the full range of political rights (page 60). The concept of moral citizens can be especially helpful when discussing the rights of illegal immigrants. 

 

        Earlier in Chapter 2, Professor Brettschneider clarified that resident aliens “retain a right to be treated as democratic citizens in a moral sense because of their status as addressees of law” (page 32). If one is to extend this analysis to consider illegal immigrants as moral citizens and addressees of the law, then deportation of illegal immigrants is unjustifiable coercion that undermines their sovereign status and violates the core values. The core value of reciprocity would require that the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the state more broadly, be defensible to a reasonable citizen (page 25). Assuming that a person living in the United States illegally acts in accordance with the core values—contributing economically, culturally, and interpersonally to the surrounding community—then the reasonable citizen would object to deportation. If a citizen were to endorse deportation on the grounds that illegal immigrants are not legal citizens, then they would be undermining the democratic legitimacy of the United States government. Violating the core values and sovereign status of one group of citizens has the potential to delegitimize the entire state. 

        

        In respecting these rights, a moral citizen enjoying sovereignty and status of addressee of the law may choose to earn the full range of political rights by becoming a legal citizen. Yet, there is no defensible reason to force them to pursue legal citizenship. Reciprocity and the rights of addressees of the law also demands that laws, like pursuing legal citizenship “must be constructed such that citizens who choose to obey them do so not merely because of the threat of sanction, but because the laws treat them in a way consistent with their status as free and equal rulers” (page 32). Even if someone chooses not to pursue legal citizenship, the distinction between moral and legal citizens is of political rights, not justifiable treatment, so there is no way to defend deportation of moral citizens.