Krasemann - Blog Post 9

 

In Chapter 3 of Democratic Rights, Corey Brettschneider explores the notion of democratic citizenship as opposed to legal citizenship. I find the distinction to be interesting and worth looking into further. In his words, “persons who are not legal but moral citizens can embrace the ideal of democratic citizenship when they think and deliberate about public policies and basic rights” (60). What role do legal citizens play in society as opposed to democratic citizens? Brettschneider does not view citizenship as a legal term, but rather a moral one. Moral citizenship is “a principle of treatment that con-strains how democratic polities can coerce all persons subject to their control” (61).

 

Brettschneider establishes that “citizens are persons entitled to be treated in accordance with the three core values and obligated to treat their fellow citizens in the same way” (58). I immediately considered the social position of illegal immigrants. Brettschneider’s explanation of citizenship on a moral ground helps answer some of my questions, but it is still worth considering the difference between a legal and a moral citizen. Is moral citizenship universal across the world? If so, there would need to be necessary moral guidelines that countries around the world abide by. If one country has a different opinion on moral citizenship, then variances across borders may create conflicts with rights and treatment. On the other hand, if countries decide not to grant illegal immigrants neither moral nor legal citizenship, then these illegal immigrants are subject to serious repercussions. The establishment of universal morality would alleviate such issues.

 

Another point I would like to consider as it pertains to citizenship is reciprocity. Brettschneider states that “citizens must have the capacities that would enable them to engage in and under-stand their entitlement to reciprocal reason giving” (58). Do illegal citizens or visitors still have a responsibility under the reciprocity of government? Are these people still subject to substantive democratic values as they pertain to reciprocity? If someone is not a legal citizen, one would think that the government has less of a responsibility to uphold certain systemic values, perhaps such as those of protection. What distinction can we draw between a government’s duty to legal versus illegal citizens? Likewise, what duty does an illegal citizen have to a government that they are legally not under? This is different from the discussion of moral citizens.

 

Perhaps this can introduce the notion of free-riding. Illegal citizens benefit from living under a government that they are not legally obligated to, and the government benefits off of the labor of illegal citizens who have no obligation to the government. This assertion may be somewhat far-fetched, but it may also be worth considering.

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