Fish- Blog Post 9
In Democratic Rights, Corey Brettschneider provides his account of democratic contractualism. This is a theory that, “as an account of legitimate coercion and the rights of citizens, draws from the concern to assure that the rights of individuals are protected because of their status as members of a sovereign people” (57). In his account, he distinguishes between “persons” “people” and “citizens” as he rejects the “unanimous will” of the people (57). However, in making this distinction, Brettschneider only addresses the importance of separating these three entities in the political sphere, and does not account for the potential danger in believing individuals have the capacity to compartmentalize these parts of themselves.
Specifically, the difference Brettschneider draws out between “people” and “persons” poses a number of concerns when it comes to feasibility. He defines persons as “individuals defined by their distinct understandings of their own wills” (57). In contrast, people “refers to a community whose members are treated and treat each other in accordance with the core values of democracy” (57). While this seems to be both a reasonable and logical distinction politically speaking, in reality these two things are not easily separated by the self. Take police officers: if they are racist or bigoted at home as a “person,” how they act in the public, as part of the people, is most likely to be carried over from their private and personal life and that danger cannot be overstated. The privacy of being a person is not so private when individuals belong to a democratic state. The public and private spheres are constantly intermixed, particularly when it comes to individual values.
To look even further, consider a case Brettschneider himself poses. In discussing capital punishment, he asserts that “Because state institutions do not perfectly administer justice, they should embody reasonable balances between the interests of society and those of the accused” (109-110). He writes about the importance of improving DNA technology to help best prove guilt or innocence, “such that the possibility of wrongful convictions no longer will be cause for concern” (110). Yet, in understanding that there is substantive scientific evidence from psychologists that prove memory itself is extremely fallible, it becomes a question as to why this is not enough to eliminate or at least reduce cause for concern. Witnesses have been proven time and time again to be manipulated, preemptively biased, or to simply have had false or skewed memories. The public, or the “people” have continued to resist these findings even though it is useful information in assessing the justice of certain convictions, and so balancing the interests of society has become very difficult as those interests are at times unreasonable or illogical. The reason people do not want to believe memory is fallible is because of the values people hold as persons. Their individual value placed on their memory extends to their values as people, and here the conflict in separating these entities is exemplified.
Given these two examples, rooted in the legal system, I am left questioning how useful it is to identify people, persons, and citizens as three different things politically when it is so damaging in the public sphere. The differentiation or compartmentalization of these three entities within the individual seems to be impossible to achieve. Unless all individuals as persons are able to remove their bias, can we actually claim that there are people, persons and citizens separately when it comes to the will of the people?
Specifically, the difference Brettschneider draws out between “people” and “persons” poses a number of concerns when it comes to feasibility. He defines persons as “individuals defined by their distinct understandings of their own wills” (57). In contrast, people “refers to a community whose members are treated and treat each other in accordance with the core values of democracy” (57). While this seems to be both a reasonable and logical distinction politically speaking, in reality these two things are not easily separated by the self. Take police officers: if they are racist or bigoted at home as a “person,” how they act in the public, as part of the people, is most likely to be carried over from their private and personal life and that danger cannot be overstated. The privacy of being a person is not so private when individuals belong to a democratic state. The public and private spheres are constantly intermixed, particularly when it comes to individual values.
To look even further, consider a case Brettschneider himself poses. In discussing capital punishment, he asserts that “Because state institutions do not perfectly administer justice, they should embody reasonable balances between the interests of society and those of the accused” (109-110). He writes about the importance of improving DNA technology to help best prove guilt or innocence, “such that the possibility of wrongful convictions no longer will be cause for concern” (110). Yet, in understanding that there is substantive scientific evidence from psychologists that prove memory itself is extremely fallible, it becomes a question as to why this is not enough to eliminate or at least reduce cause for concern. Witnesses have been proven time and time again to be manipulated, preemptively biased, or to simply have had false or skewed memories. The public, or the “people” have continued to resist these findings even though it is useful information in assessing the justice of certain convictions, and so balancing the interests of society has become very difficult as those interests are at times unreasonable or illogical. The reason people do not want to believe memory is fallible is because of the values people hold as persons. Their individual value placed on their memory extends to their values as people, and here the conflict in separating these entities is exemplified.
Given these two examples, rooted in the legal system, I am left questioning how useful it is to identify people, persons, and citizens as three different things politically when it is so damaging in the public sphere. The differentiation or compartmentalization of these three entities within the individual seems to be impossible to achieve. Unless all individuals as persons are able to remove their bias, can we actually claim that there are people, persons and citizens separately when it comes to the will of the people?
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