Mehra - Blog Post 9

  In Chapter 5 of Democratic Rights, Professor Corey Brettschneider argues through democratic contractualism that there must be limitations on state punishment such criminals are treated in their capacity as citizens. Criminals must maintain substantive rights (like the right to free speech, the right to vote in national elections, and the right to life). Specifically, Brettscneider argues that the state must “formulat[e] punishments in a manner consistent with the core values,” meaning that “we should act which punishment a criminal qua citizen reasonably could accept” (97). While I understand the importance of the state acting in accordance with the core values (such as by upholding the rule of law), I question whether the states hurts more people than it protects when recognizing criminals-- particularly violent ones-- in their capacity as citizens who can uphold the core values. 

Brettschneider argues criminals should be treated as citizens because they are subject to (quite extreme) coercion at the hands of the state. I would argue, however, that a violent criminal’s capacity to act in accordance with the core values should be qualified, specifically for the value of reciprocity. In making this argument, I will explain how this might limit a violent criminal’s right to vote while in prison. I specify “violent criminal” because such criminals in some way violated the liberties of another person, and situate this argument within ideal theory. 

The core value of reciprocity “appeal[s] to citizens’ common values of autonomy and equality to discern the limits of coercion,” assuming that people act as moral-minded, non-self-interested citizens (25). Violent criminals have, in most cases, proven to not have sufficient capacity for reciprocity. Someone who is a serial killer surely does not “commit to reason” and respect the equality and autonomy of other people when voting or otherwise. 

There are convincing reasons as to why a criminal should be viewed in their capacity as a citizen, despite evidence pointing to them as not having this capacity. But in instances where a criminals’ failed attempts at reciprocity have the potential to influence the lives of other citizens who do embrace their capacity, the state has a responsibility to limit the rights of criminals. Brettschneider argues that while criminals might be restricted in voting in local elections, particularly for sheriffs, they should retain a right to vote in national elections. But should the right to vote in national elections really be guaranteed for people who have proven that they are unable to embrace the core values of democracy while they are paying their debt to society? If a violent criminal has shown an unwillingness to function as a citizen, should his right to influence the political sphere not be temporarily suspended?  In restricting this right, is the state unjustifiably denying citizens a democratic right as authors of the law, or is it taking an action to protect the vast majority of authors and addressees who have not disproven their capacity to act in accordance with the core values?

I mentioned earlier that I situate this argument within ideal theory. Under our current non-ideal criminal justice system, where Black and Latino men are disproportionately incarcerated, the question of suspending voting rights for citizens while imprisoned is more complex. The prison population might, in fact, have a very justified reason to vote: so that they can help change a system in which they are systematically disadvantaged.