Ivashkiv blog 8

     In Chapter One, “The Principle of Public Relevance and Democratic Persuasion,” Brettschneider outlines the foundation of his theory of value democracy. He envisions a society that allows for “equal citizenship under the law” (31). His solution is to have a state that condemns all speech or legislation that seeks to limit the rights of different groups of the population. In Section III, he proposes that this limitation will relate to political terms, not the general notion of equality. 

Interestingly, Brettschneider recognizes that “the principle of public relevance is potentially quite broad because it concerns citizens’ beliefs and practices across multiple domains” (30). So, to escape this anxiety, he appropriates Locke, “the principle is ‘political, not metaphysical”(30). In order to advance the point, he cites examples where discrimination obviously leads to a group being treated as second-class - he does not need to convince anyone why slavery, discrimination, or anti-same-sex legislation were wrong (31-32). Society has progressed to a point where it easy to discern why those examples were bad for society. However, it seems as though his argument does not properly account for current moral blindspots, or what societies in hundreds of years will condemn us for.

Brettschnedier wants to use the animus doctrine to help explain what violates equal citizenship, “The animus doctrine helps us to identify the kinds of beliefs that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship” (34). Yet, I do not see exactly how the animus doctrine would help society decipher our moral blind spots. In Bretschneider’s view, the animus doctrine should prohibit actions that deprive equal freedoms. In this way, Brettschneider’s opinion differs from the Supreme Court’s ruling that used rationality as the measure to decide when a law was unjust. However, it seems like rationality can be required to determine whether a law or practice violates equal freedom. This is because equal freedom can mean different things at different times. An anti-Semitic hate group can indeed be completely rational in their hatred, while Brettschneider’s proposal would strike down the practices of that hate group. However, other groups, completely outside the scope of race, sexuality, and gender, can be subjugated to less than equal conditions. Brettschneider does not meaningfully pay attention to this, showing that Brettschndeir uses rationality to determine his definition of equal freedom. The most obvious example is the incarcerated and formerly incarcerated, who often lose their voting rights either during or even after the sentence is over. Another group is animals. Perhaps this is controversial, but it is possible to imagine a future society that strikes down a statue of Obama because he ate meat. How does Brettschneider consider future generations, whose abilities to behave as equal citizens in contemporary society may be destroyed by climate change? All these examples point to the idea that who should be protected, or even what equal protection is, is liable to change.

It is impossible to ignore that Brettschndeiers’ biases and place in world history inform his opinion of the breadth of equal protection. Despite what Brettschneider implies, what or who constitutes a second-class citizen is not set in stone, even in the political sphere. In this way, his proposal could result in laws that future generations might consider repulsive, and precedent that could be difficult to undo.