Simionas Blog Post 8

 In his introduction, Brettschneider presents his solution to the debate of neutralists and prohibitionists on the types of free speech that should be protected or not. His solution is to “distinguish between a state’s coercive power, or its ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and its expressive power, or its ability to influence beliefs and behavior by ‘speaking’ to hate groups and the larger society” by “simultaneously protect[ing] hateful viewpoints in its coercive capacity and citizen them in its expressive capacity” (4). 

My concern with his argument is the practicality between a government convincingly expressing its disapproval of ideas that it cannot coercively challenge. Actions that are expressive in nature and attain their value from being expressed run the risk of being replaced with performative actions. Some current examples of this can often be seen in U.S. politics in discrepancies between political leaders’ messages and actions. It is almost insulting to hear the officials elected to change laws say they are disgusted with certain policies in place as if all of their hands are tied. Political leaders in the U.S can (and have) condemn(ed) instances of police brutality, racism, gun violence, and more and yet offer no new protections. Additionally, the ability for government leaders’ expressive messages to be widely heard and appreciated is dependent on many moving factors: a captive audience is not always guaranteed yet would be necessary for Brettschneider’s argument to set any precedents. Access and openness  to government messages may depend on wealth, your faith or lack of in the government, language barriers, or a disinterested general public.. To this, I would guess Brettschneider would point to his idea that this must be widespread across government leaders. But could a general mistrust in the government undermine their expressive messages? How much confidence must there be that the state’s expressive messages to society denouncing this speech are effective, because if they are ineffective does the risk of the entitlements hateful speech takes from others outweigh the entitlements in coercive punishment for the one spewing the hate? If there is a level of uncertainty in the effectiveness of Brettschnieder’s argument in practice, can it proportionally outweigh the entitlements and duties he assigned?  

Additionally, I question Brettschneider’s referral to discriminatory speech as political (3). It seems dangerously generous to say that blatantly racist or sexist comments fall into the same category as disagreements on tax, policy, or government purpose/structure. I do see moments where it is considered political, but I do not think it can universally be considered political. How does this change their ability to be protected coercively or expressively? It’s worth noting that I wonder how much of my understanding of discriminatory speech lies on the side of moral or political philosophy, but would it only be considered political philosophy because of its ability to counter political unity, and basics of freedom?