PPECMC2021CovidCrusaders

In Unstrapping the Straitjacket of Preference , Elizabeth Anderson unpacks Sen’s critique of preference and the multiple purposes it serves actually show that preference is not simply one ‘dogma’ which economists can use to solve all their problems. The three purposes of preference that Sen identifies are “a) to describe a person's choices; b) to represent whatever motives underlie a person’s choices; and c) to represent a person’s welfare,” (22). He claims that these are actually three different things: choice, underlying motive, and welfare. Further, he argues that people often choose to act in ways that do not maximize their preferences on the basis of what he calls ‘commitment.’ This idea of commitment is best described as counter-preferential choice because it is when people act on principle as opposed to preference. This action is still rational, despite not advancing the preferences of the individual because it is based on socially and ethically desirable principles (24). ...

In Elizabeth Anderson’s essay “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” she adds to Amartya Sen’s argument for raising suspicion against the concept of economic preferences that define rational human choices as ones that advance an individual’s welfare. This stems from a misunderstanding that people’s preferences always align with advancing themselves: “Preference conceived as a choice or motive fails to do so, because people have motives wide than and sometimes even counter to their self-interests, and often choose accordingly” (23). Instead of framing people’s choices as individual, self-interested ones, Anderson proposes the idea of “collective agency.” She maintains that if people can identify a problem that can be resolved by joining forces, then they rationally and morally should, and this “Practical identification with others does not require any prior acquaintance or relationship” (31). In fact, two complete strangers can find an association with one another that “would...

  In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson extends arguments made by Amartya Sen to provide a theory for the rationality of committed action. Anderson swiftly walks the reader through an argument that begins with addressing problems in the reasonings provided for outcomes in the prisoners’ dilemma, develops and tests a new theory through various examples and case studies, and is able to extend the argument to as grand of claims as expanding the “community of identity to the whole of humanity” and finding the point where “rationality coincides with morality” (37). In her argument, the decisions made by the individuals in the prisoners’ dilemma would be based on their ability to see themselves as common members of a social group and rephrase their question to “What should we do?” (28). However Anderson moves beyond this conclusion to a driving factor for individuals to be capable of seeing themselves as common members that “depends on a prior determinat...

It is interesting to consider Anderson’s comments on voting within the context of other social issues, namely climate change. But I think a very similar argument could be made for not eating meat. Anderson places importance on identity derived from a group. This group identity makes it easier to explain behavior that is not utility-maximizing but is socially and morally intuitive. Anderson’s case in point is voting. Anderson shows that there is no reason to value voting if you want to maximize your utility. This is uncontroversial. One individual vote does not really matter, making the time required to cast that vote meaningless under consequentialism. Of course then, this criticism carries into altruistic views as well. If a vote has zero sum, then standing in line and filling out your ballot is not act-consequential, and one could spend that time doing more altruistic activities. Unfortunately, voting takes some portion of time so “there is always some inconvenience. So I ought not t...

  In discussing Sen’s argument on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, Anderson asserts that “it is hardly foolish to not prefer the act of cooperation in itself, apart from its consequences” (page 27). She demonstrates this by providing the example of voting for a preferred consequence, not merely just for the act of voting (Anderson, 26). While Anderson may be correct in arguing that in some situations the consequences of cooperation are preferable to the act of cooperation, there is still an intrinsic value in cooperation.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith discusses the various passions which evoke sympathy or resentment from the indifferent spectator. Smith would likely categorize cooperation as a social passion which “when expressed in the countenance or behavior even towards those who are not particularly connected to ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost every occasion” (Smith, 36). Cooperation as a “social and benevolent affection,...

In her paper, Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference’, Elizabeth Anderson elaborates on Amartya Sen’s contributions to philosophy and economics. Anderson focuses much of her essay on the idea that it is disingenuous and blatantly lazy (this feels a little more implied than stated in her paper) to attribute economic choices and rationality to a set of preferences that boil down to nothing more than utility. Anderson argues that following from Sen, it is not always utility and preference in the broad sense that determine a person’s actions or choices. Many other factors play into the unquestioned dogma of economic preferences, and Anderson elaborates on mostly one. She begins her argument by extending the prisoner’s dilemma, adding in ideas that seem very class conscious Marx-esque. Marxist theory, however, is not what I hope to develop. Anderson overcomes the inadequacies of rational-choice economic theory by creating her concept of committed action. Anderson defines committe...

  In “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference,’” Elizabeth Anderson explores collective action problems in the prisoner’s dilemma. In conceptualizing the prisoner’s dilemma, Anderson explores “solutions” to the problem; situations in which collective action succeeds and cooperation ensues. In this prisoner dilemma, a solution would entail the prisoners collaborating to both get less time rather than ratting the other out.  The use of the word “solution” here raises interesting questions. To me, “solution” implies solving a problem; here, while the prisoners may be solving their problem, the general society may not be. In fact, society at large may have a new problem on its hands if guilty prisoners undermine the justice system by cooperating to lighten the sentences they deserve. Anderson acknowledges this issue when she writes that “not all committed action is desirable from a moral point of view. Recall that the original setting for the prisoner's dilemma involves two ...