PPECMC2021CovidCrusaders

  First Half: Olivia Wills + Sarah + Hurley Amari Second Half: Tara Thomas Jess Josh Cam   Before break :   Olivia: two critiques of universal sympathy: sociopaths and closeted individuals, specifically LGBTQ+   Wills: The evolutionary purpose of human virtues and sympathy, how moral sentiments are a system of “carrots and sticks”     Sarah: Benevolent actions/virtues can be deceptively selfish and easily misguided     Hurley: Does the origin of virtue or reason undermine its truth or value?   Amari: Adjusting emotions seems to undermine Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to free speech   After break :   Tara: Wealth and antitrust laws as they pertain to sympathy, why the wealthy maintain their wealth and how it threatens democracy.   Thomas: How to maximize sympathy (empathy) through relationships, whether society is mostly selfish or sympathetic.   Jess: How Smith’s concept of rank and wealth relates to privileg...

 In Section II, Chapter II, Adam Smith focuses on passions that are derived from the imagination, which are specific to the unique experiences of individuals. These types of passions, according to Smith, are hard to sympathize with because they are experienced differently for each person. Smith’s primary example of this is type of passion is love. If someone is in love, we may think their feelings are reasonable, but we cannot conceive of their passion in the same way that we can when someone is angry or resentful. As Smith says, “Our imagination not having run in the same channel with that of the lover, we cannot enter into the eagerness of his emotions.” (Smith 28). From the outside, the passion of the lover seems wildly disproportionate to the value of the object of their love.   Love seems like an especially important and unique passion that I think deserves a little more attention than Smith gave it. Compared to other passions, love is incredibly rare. Emotions like r...

  In the first two sections of his book A Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith develops a system by which he understands humans to possess morality concerning others in their environment. He begins by creating the idea of sympathy by which humans feel for one another. He lists and expands on different types of this sympathy and extends the paradigm onto the human fear of death. If we are to project our conscious sympathy onto those who are dead, we develop a fear of those who lack autarchy. He then goes into various situations and examples in which sympathy may vary with its response. An exciting and relatively intuitive case is one in which someone is overly happy about a small act of fortune. We see them as being frivolous and odd. This leads to the idea of propriety, a concept by which we deem specific emotional responses normal or unwarranted. Smith then distinguishes between the idea of virtue and priority. Virtue is the idea of how one conforms to etiquette in various way...

In Part I, Section III, Chapter II of The Theory of Moral Sentiment , Adam Smith explores the distinction of ranks. He begins by discussing nobleman, and questions “what important accomplishments is the young nobleman instructed to support the dignity of his rank, and to render himself worthy of that superiority over his fellow-citizens” (65). Smith brings up the case of Louis XIV who was regarded with esteem and admiration as a well-respected prince. In spite of this reputation, Smith claims that he had mere “frivolous accomplishments” and “mediocre” talents and virtues. He furthers that Louis XIV was conscious of the “favour” he was afforded in regards to any inclinations he had, which enabled him to feel a sense of freedom.  To me, this description evokes the concept of privilege. Smith, in describing the fortune of the nobleman, seems to be acknowledging that privilege (in terms of rank), rather than virtue or talent, accounts for the reputation and esteem of those who are situ...

  In Section 1 Chapter 5 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Adam Smith outlines that there are standards for having relevant “amiable and respectable virtues.” He argues that people should learn to adjust their passions in order to receive a reasonable understanding from an “impartial spectator.” In this way, there is a distinction between “virtue and mere propriety.” Virtue deserves to be admired and celebrated; whereas mere propriety deserves only to be approved of. The former is one that requires an adjustment from the speaker such that it can reflect a level of emotion that can be understood by the impartial spectator. Of course, there is a sliding scale between completely disregarding the standpoint of the observer and expressing suffering to the exact degree that the impartial spectator is able to sympathize with. People’s virtues, then, can be judged between “complete propriety and perfection” and the “idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfecti...

Smith details how empathy, what he calls sympathy, is rooted in selfish reasons in some way. Through sympathy, people gain happiness. Smith outlines this idea in his opening lines - “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him” (11). If this is true, then it is reasonable to assume some people may achieve the most amount of happiness by maximizing sympathy. This depends on the person’s preferences, but, if “nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow feeling with all the emotions of our own breast,” then many people should resort to sympathy to be as happy as possible (17). As shown, happiness is rooted in feelings of similarity which are facilitated by sympathy. Relationships are one effective way to elicit these feelings of similarity. So, it seems like people would love to have as many relationships as possible if they want to ...

Self-love, Smith suggests, is pleasure in one's own good fortune. Sympathy, by contrast, is pleasure in the fortunes of others. (ch i) In the case of sympathy, I experience pleasure, but only if, and because, of some benefit to you, and I experience pain, but only if, and because, of some suffering by you. Mutual sympathy, people sharing your grief, or outrage, or joy, or resentment, is one of the great sources of happiness for people (ch II) To be in sympathetic accord, whether with someone's passion, or their opinion, or their taste, just is to admit the reasonableness of the passion, opinion, or taste (ch III) But in the case of judgments of opinion and judgments of taste we can both adopt the same perspective towards a painting or a scientific observation, whereas in the case of passions your grief is distinctively yours, my resentment is distinctively mine, etc.  How can we enter into alignment with such passions, given that we cannot in the same way adopt the same perspec...