Miller - Blog 11

In Part I, Section III, Chapter II of The Theory of Moral Sentiment, Adam Smith explores the distinction of ranks. He begins by discussing nobleman, and questions “what important accomplishments is the young nobleman instructed to support the dignity of his rank, and to render himself worthy of that superiority over his fellow-citizens” (65). Smith brings up the case of Louis XIV who was regarded with esteem and admiration as a well-respected prince. In spite of this reputation, Smith claims that he had mere “frivolous accomplishments” and “mediocre” talents and virtues. He furthers that Louis XIV was conscious of the “favour” he was afforded in regards to any inclinations he had, which enabled him to feel a sense of freedom. 

To me, this description evokes the concept of privilege. Smith, in describing the fortune of the nobleman, seems to be acknowledging that privilege (in terms of rank), rather than virtue or talent, accounts for the reputation and esteem of those who are situated in fortunate situations upon birth. As Smith states, Louis XIV’s “air, his manner, his deportment, all mark that elegant and graceful sense of his own superiority, which those who are born to inferior stations can hardly ever arrive at” (65). This speaks to the idea that no amount of hard work, sacrifice, and toil can ever yield the same results as privilege. Since those of high rank can achieve “glory … in the propriety of his ordinary behaviour,” they feel that it is both unnecessary and unwise to “embarrass himself with what can be attended either with difficulty or distress” (67). Furthermore, Smith’s words highlight the freedom that comes with privilege. Knowing that all one’s inclinations will be met with favor instills a distinct sense of freedom that those without privilege may likely never know.

Smith also explores the situation of those of “inferior rank.” He explains that persons of inferior rank cannot expect the same accomplishments (as those of high rank) to distinguish them. Smith contends that “if ever he hopes to distinguish himself, it must be by more important virtues. He must acquire dependants to balance the dependants of the great, and he has no other fund to pay them from, but the labour of his body, and the activity of his mind” (67). Put simply, the standards of success, and the effort needed for achievement, is far greater for those of “inferior rank” than they are for those who come from privilege. 

Despite acknowledging the greater task put before persons of “inferior rank” who look to distinguish themselves, Smith claims that the highest offices in government are often held by those of middle and inferior rank who “have been carried forward by their own industry and abilities, though loaded with the jealousy, and opposed by the resentment, of all those who were born their superiors” (68). It is interesting to question whether this holds true in 21st century society. Are the upper echelons of our government composed of persons with little privilege? Though I do not know the answer for certain, I would guess not. This raises interesting questions about whether institutions that maintain and protect privilege have become stronger since Smith’s writing, or if his observations were never sound.

Smith touches upon the loss of privilege. He explains that “putting an end to such perfect enjoyment” of privilege is the most “atrocious of all injuries” (63). To me, this relates to the hesitation in today’s society to acknowledge and surrender privilege, though its presence is so clearly existent and dominant. Smith contends that, “mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow” (60). This may explain persons' aversions towards challenging systems of privilege, because they would rather sympathize with the privileged person’s joy than sorrow. While this may explain it, it certainly does not excuse it.