Huang - Blog 11

 In Section 1 Chapter 5 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith outlines that there are standards for having relevant “amiable and respectable virtues.” He argues that people should learn to adjust their passions in order to receive a reasonable understanding from an “impartial spectator.” In this way, there is a distinction between “virtue and mere propriety.” Virtue deserves to be admired and celebrated; whereas mere propriety deserves only to be approved of. The former is one that requires an adjustment from the speaker such that it can reflect a level of emotion that can be understood by the impartial spectator. Of course, there is a sliding scale between completely disregarding the standpoint of the observer and expressing suffering to the exact degree that the impartial spectator is able to sympathize with. People’s virtues, then, can be judged between “complete propriety and perfection” and the “idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection” (21). Ultimately, though, adjusting one’s standpoint for the audience is the most virtuous. However, this faces a major problem with Seana Shiffrin’s arguments for truth in Speech Matters


Shiffrin argues that speech should be framed in a “thinker-based approach” that does not distinguish tiers of truth-telling, and does not move emotional communication to a different tier: “the exchange of thoughts, beliefs, emotions, perceptions, and ideas with others is essential to each person’s ability to function well as a thinker and as a moral agent” (94). One of the main reasons for this is because there is no way to know what another person thinks apart from what they express verbally via their speech. There is no method to reach into someone’s mind to discover their genuine thoughts, so people must express their thoughts truthfully because “moral agency is a cooperative matter that depends on reliable channels of communication… for its development and realization” (114). As such, it is potentially dangerous to argue that censoring, limiting, or adjusting expressions of your passions in order to match a reasonable level of sympathy from an impartial spectator. If someone does not sympathize with your degrees of emotions regarding a specific topic, it could be more beneficial, more virtuous, to engage in persuasion or a discussion than to seek sympathy.


Do Smith’s accounts of virtue significantly contradict the value of speech in expressing truth? To what extent does the importance of seeking sympathy outweigh the importance of adopting truth-telling and therefore social trust? Should we prioritize seeking sympathy over the value of persuasion?


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