Spangler Blog Post 11

 

In Part I of Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith gives his account of the human virtues and how they originate from in relation to our social interactions with one another. He describes the way that people subconsciously experience the emotions of others within themselves, calling this sympathy. However, maybe due to the way language has shifted over time, the concept he alludes to much closer describes empathy. Empathy, correctly understood, is a physiological adaptation of humans (and some other mammals) that allows them to better interact with and understand one another. I could not help but take a psychological view of his descriptions, and attempt to reconcile them with my understanding of how our evolution has resulted in us acquiring these traits.

The way I view the human race is simply as very intelligent monkeys, and so much of what Smith refers to is directly correlated with our physiological needs as monkeys. It is widely known that we are social creatures, so it is no wonder that “the mirth of company…enlivens our own mirth, and their silence …disappoints us,” (7). Further, our striving for agreeable and disagreeable passions is based on our need to feel connected in a group (7). When we were swinging from vines a few generations ago, if we fell out with the other monkeys in our group, that abandonment could lead to excommunication from the group and likely death. “The general idea of provocation excites no sympathy,” because dispute within our evolutionary ancestors’ social groups had much more dire consequences (6). The sympathy to which Smith refers and the fear of death that “afflicts and mortifies individuals,” are in fact the same thing. The fear of being rejected by the group is so interwoven with our need for survival, that the need to understand others and be understood has nested itself so firmly in our genetic makeup in the form of empathy.

Considering that empathy is just a survival instinct, it is interesting that Smith, and many others, seek to draw from that an acceptable system of interacting with each other, by holding certain traits as virtuous. The amiable virtues are the ones that give in to this aspect of our nature, those that allow us to connect more deeply and fluidly with each other (11). The amiable virtues are valued primarily because of the care they show for others and imply that one cares more about others than themselves. The respectable virtues of self-denial and self-governance are valuable for different yet similar reasons. These virtues signal the outward rejection of one’s own survival instincts for the sake of the group, restraining the dopamine signals in our brain for a greater purpose (11). The culmination of these, “to restrain our selfishness, and give in to our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature,” (12). Virtues, and so many other moral institutions, are simply an elaborate system of carrots and sticks that use direct our primal instincts in a manner that keeps us from devolving back into the monkeys we once were, yet they remain essential to our interactions even today.