Simionas Blog Post 9

 In chapter 3, Brettschneider provides an account of his principle of democracy’s public reason and the inclusion principle as the basic of justifiable coercion. His twofold approach allows his argument to be viewed from two fundamental perspectives: from “the general level of democracy’s public reason” as well as the law’s “impact on specific individuals. Within these two principles, I found two points where I questioned the practicality of Brettschneider’s argument in practice. In one of the cases Brettschneider concedes the point himself, which may raise a larger question of the role of ideal theory. 

In the principle of democracy’s public reason, there is the discussion of “common status,” rooted in the differentiation between persons and citizens. Since society will have “pluralistic conceptions of the good,” citizens must appeal to the core values, and these core values must be compatible with multiple conceptions of the good, and bracket values they may hold as a person to uphold the terms of democracy’s public reason (63). My question to Brettschneider would be, how do we address a society where people are unwilling to bracket their personal beliefs in the way required here? It seems that many political issues in the U.S today are deeply tied to personal beliefs that not only our citizens but our representatives and politicians are not willing to shake. While I agree with his idea that it is necessary to bracket these beliefs aside and appeal to core values, how do we do so in practice or how do we advance from a society where it is so commonly practiced to not bracket our beliefs? Examples can include representatives who are adamantly pro-choice or are anti-LGBTQ+ rights for religious reasons in the public sphere. 

Additionally, I question the feasibility of the “Motivation to Reach Universal Agreement” within the inclusion principle, a point that Brettschneider touches on himself in the last paragraph of this subsection. He writes “Of course some persons qua persons might reject the project of seeking democratic rights justifiable to all. My account of citizenship, however, is an ideal for thinking about politics… not a description of actual motivation” (68). While I agree with his ideas that “citizens should take seriously each other’s status as free and equal” and thus balance their interests and recognize the “common fate [we have in lawmaking’s] effect,” but there is an undeniable population of wildly self interested individuals of which I question their ability to separate their role as persons and citizens, and actively strive for agreement. Brettschneider does concede that this is an ideal, and thus my question would be how would he explain the relationship between this ideal and practices that counter it: how can this theory still be effective? Does non-ideal theory play a role in addressing this issue? This may open a larger discussion to a larger discussion of the role and benefits of ideal theory, of which I would love to hear Brettschneider’s understanding.