Nagra Blog Post 9

 In chapter five of his book, Democratic Rights, Corey Brettschneider uses his basic idea of democracy in a value theory to delve into the topic of the punished’s rights. Many philosophers have contended that criminals, by disobeying the core values of democracy, have given up their moral citizenship and therefore are not entitled to the same rights as ordinary citizens. Brettschneider contests that while criminals are still subject to some state coercion through punishment, they cannot be coerced by “punishment a criminal qua citizen would not accept” (97). This constraint is applied to bar the state from practicing “cruel and unusual punishment,” making state punishment “substantively different from private approaches to punishment” (104). Society must “respect the reasonable interests of all citizens, not just the interests of specific individuals or groups” (105). I wish to extend some of Brettschneider’s contentions against removing fundamental democratic rights from criminals to the case of inmate education. Brettschneider, through his description of a prisoner’s right to speech and freedom against second-class citizenship, embraces the rehabilitative approach of prison education. 

A basal level of education combined with the state’s coercive approach would allow punishment while respecting a criminal qua citizen’s right to free speech and communication. Drawing on Shiffrin’s theories, leaving prisoners uneducated would be to place them in a sort of intellectual isolation, arguably an intense form of cruel and unusual punishment. Prisoners would not only be able to advocate for better criminal justice treatment, an argument they are uniquely positioned to advocate for, but would be able to enter society as less of a criminal and more of a citizen. This is, after all, what they were before being labeled as a criminal. This argument could apply more fittingly to juvenile justice. Educational programs here would need to be much more comprehensive and civics oriented to educate criminals not only about valuable technical skills but to allow them to reflect on the very core values of democracy that they violated. 

Brettschneider furthers this point in his discussion of capital punishment. Capital punishment inherently “robs persons of their humanity” (108). An uneducated person, let alone a citizen is intellectually isolated and robbed of her human consciousness and right to discuss and hear other political views. Justification of education for criminals should be relatively intuitive. By educating prisoners on practical skills and civics, society both significantly prevents recidivism while avoiding creating a secondary “prisoner” class. Does this view of free speech, combined with Shiffrin's intellectual isolation, create a democratic right to prison education?