Fish- Blog Post 11
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith provides an account of human virtues, and in particular on sympathy. He asserts that sympathy “enlivens joy, and alleviates grief” (9). Specifically, with mutual sympathy, “Upon his sympathy they seem to disburden themselves of a part of their distress” (9). Smith sees sympathy as a source of pleasure and relief, and something we as humans all feel situationally by imagining what others go through. However, I believe there are two critical flaws with this analysis of sympathy.
First, individuals that are sociopathic do not feel sympathy, and therefore Smith’s analysis of sympathy is not actually as universal as he believes it to be. Sociopaths lack a sense of conscience, and because of this stand in opposition to Smith. He writes that “If the very appearance of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them” (5). The sociopath would not be inspired by these emotions, and therefore would not develop a sense of sympathy.
The second issue is whether or not individuals feel that certain issues they experience are safe to share with another person. Because Smith is insistent in the idea that “we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion,” meaning we can always turn to a friend instead of the more difficult road of going through it alone, certain confessions pose a great deal of risk to individuals. Consider a closeted individual who is struggling to come to terms with their sexual orientation or gender identity. Despite this being a quite stressful, difficult process, many do not feel safe or comfortable sharing it with anyone. Getting sympathy is often not an option. While it most definitely should be an option, the institutional prejudice that exists makes it difficult to trust others with certain challenges that are more taboo in broader society. Particularly in a time when homosexuality was illegal, it would be a lot to expect of queer individuals to feel comfortable opening up to a friend to at least somewhat “disburden themselves” (9).
Given these two concerns, it seems as though Smith’s assessment of sympathy is more restrictive than it may at first seem. A number of studies have been done that state around 1 in 100 people are sociopaths, and that number is not going down. Because of this, the incorporation of sociopaths in a discussion of sympathy makes it more limited. Additionally, considering the case of closeted LGBTQ+ individuals adds another layer of nuance: is sympathy always welcome, or is there sometimes not even a choice of whether friends can give sympathy if they do not know the struggle in the first place?
First, individuals that are sociopathic do not feel sympathy, and therefore Smith’s analysis of sympathy is not actually as universal as he believes it to be. Sociopaths lack a sense of conscience, and because of this stand in opposition to Smith. He writes that “If the very appearance of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them” (5). The sociopath would not be inspired by these emotions, and therefore would not develop a sense of sympathy.
The second issue is whether or not individuals feel that certain issues they experience are safe to share with another person. Because Smith is insistent in the idea that “we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion,” meaning we can always turn to a friend instead of the more difficult road of going through it alone, certain confessions pose a great deal of risk to individuals. Consider a closeted individual who is struggling to come to terms with their sexual orientation or gender identity. Despite this being a quite stressful, difficult process, many do not feel safe or comfortable sharing it with anyone. Getting sympathy is often not an option. While it most definitely should be an option, the institutional prejudice that exists makes it difficult to trust others with certain challenges that are more taboo in broader society. Particularly in a time when homosexuality was illegal, it would be a lot to expect of queer individuals to feel comfortable opening up to a friend to at least somewhat “disburden themselves” (9).
Given these two concerns, it seems as though Smith’s assessment of sympathy is more restrictive than it may at first seem. A number of studies have been done that state around 1 in 100 people are sociopaths, and that number is not going down. Because of this, the incorporation of sociopaths in a discussion of sympathy makes it more limited. Additionally, considering the case of closeted LGBTQ+ individuals adds another layer of nuance: is sympathy always welcome, or is there sometimes not even a choice of whether friends can give sympathy if they do not know the struggle in the first place?
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