Stevens Blog Post 6

In Professor Berg’s paper, she exposes the shortcomings of an ideal theory of justice. While most ideal justice theorists recognize the need for bright lines in non-ideal justice, Berg goes further by arguing that even within ideal theory, basic epistemic limitations require the use of bright lines. In situations where “a) it is difficult for us to make reliable case-by-case judgements, and b) it is asymmetrically morally risky to get the judgements wrong”, a bright line is necessary for ideal justice.

While I agree with Prof Berg’s argument that ideal justice requires bright lines, I think the justification for bright lines is even deeper than she suggests and goes beyond the issue of epistemic risk. Even if we take people as more than they are—that is, as people (or computers) with perfect epistemic certainty—the need for bright lines still arises in ideal justice theory. The difference is that proxies will no longer be necessary; bright lines would be drawn on the values of justice themselves.

Consider the issue of voting rights: as Berg points out, democracies have competing interests between avoiding denial of franchise to deserving citizens and making sure voters make competent decisions for society. In Berg’s view, because we face an epistemic limitation in knowing each individual’s level of maturity, we must rely, prima facie, on age as a proxy to draw a bright line. However, even if we were to know a person’s maturity level with 100% epistemic certainty, we still need a bright line. Knowing that an individual has X level of maturity reveals nothing about whether “X” is a sufficient level for enfranchisement. Where that line should be drawn is a separate philosophical question (one that I am not prepared to answer), but the point is that it must exist somewhere.

It is tempting to think that with epistemic certainty, the best solution is to consider people on a case-by-case basis and that therefore there would be no need for bright lines. I think using a case-by-case basis is appropriate, but under the conditions of procedural justice a bright will necessarily be drawn anyways. One of the core tenants of procedural justice is consistent application of rules in similar cases. If one person with maturity level X is given the right to vote, then all others with maturity levels >X must be allowed to vote. This will inevitably lead to a clear bright line.

I think considering bright lines in the context of epistemic certainty gets at some deeper questions surrounding the issues Berg talks about. With perfect knowledge, deciding what values are worth including in the bright line calculus becomes much more important. For instance, should intelligence as well as maturity be considered for enfranchisement? Before, age served as a proxy for both and allowed us to avoid the issue, but by separating them we are forced to truly consider what values should guide our decisions.