Mehra- Blog Post 7

  In Chapter 3 of Speech Matters, Professor Shiffrin explores theoretical approaches to understanding freedom of speech in different contexts, ultimately asserting that the thinker-based approach offers a “strong, broad, and unified account of freedom of speech” (106). Shiffrin argues that the listener and speaker-based approaches can be united by the thinker-based approach. The exhaustive interests protected by the thinker-based approach “would support a freedom of speech regime that offered a principled and strong form of protection for political speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech and other forms of dissent . . . and for that of private speech and discourse” (93). 

The robust protection of free speech posed by Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach raises questions about when it would be possible (or necessary) to regulate speech under this approach, specifically considering the issues of hate speech and online content moderation. Before addressing these challenges, it is important to understand the institutional importance of free speech. Shiffrin argues in part that “a well-functioning system of social cooperation and justice presupposes that the citizenry, by and large, have active, well-developed moral personalities” (92). She also emphasizes that we have “duties to support the development and expression of the autonomous thinker” (108). 

I struggle to find a direct address of hate speech in Shiffrin’s chapter; she acknowledges the protection of “incendiary” speech (93) and suggests (at least) an adult right to obscene speech (104-105). However, I believe that there is an argument for the necessity of hate speech regulation under the thinker-based approach. In The Harm in Hate Speech, Jeremy Waldron argues that hate speech, specifically against minority groups, threatens the dignity, inclusion, and equal citizenship of these groups. Further, he notes other nations have group libel laws, which regulate attacks of groups based on several identities, like race and gender. These laws aim to prevent the perpetuation of the discrimination and subordination of minority groups, and violence against them. I might argue that a thinker-based approach should permit regulation of “incendiary” speech like hate speech because this speech perpetuates the generation of (often false) damaging stereotypes that do not necessarily “free” the speaker or the listener. In fact, I believe that the perpetuation of such misguided stereotypes threatens to achieve the goals of “well-developed moral personalities” and “autonomous thinkers” because popular stereotypes strongly, but unjustly guide people’s perceptions about certain groups, limiting the potential for challenging these stereotypes and ending discrimination. Furthermore, hate speech may threaten the right of association (and the right to think as a group) for those who are persecuted; the false narratives regarding their identity may make them feel under threat in groups. 

Second, I wonder how Professor Shiffrin sees the online world as complicating the achievement of the “well-developed moral personalities” and “autonomous thinkers” that she poses as necessary for a thriving democracy. Social media platforms such as Facebook use algorithms that push users into an “echo chamber” that confirms their own viewpoints, even if these viewpoints are not necessarily accurate or moral. Also, sites such as Facebook and Twitter can engage in content regulation, silencing the voices of individuals and consequently limiting the world from access to their thoughts. Because social media is a primary mechanism for hearing others in today’s world, and people are using social media starting at very young ages, I am concerned with how the online world affects the development of autonomous thinkers.  Would the protected interests of Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach theoretically necessitate regulating social media sites that arguably hinder thoughtful development due to algorithms, echo-chambers, and epistemic bubbles? This is a complicated legal question that implicates the rights of the government to regulate private corporations, but I think it is still important to explore in the context of Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach.