Stevens Blog Post 4

 In Chapter 1, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice that is less focused on the principles of justice and more on the process of deriving principles. His theory imagines an initial state of equality, defined as the original position, which exists before and society or government, although not in the same way as other social contract theorists like Locke and Rosseau. Rawls’s original position is purely hypothetical; it is a state filled with rational actors that have no knowledge of their actual position, talents, and possessions in society (Rawls calls this separation “the veil of ignorance”).

In sections 5 & 6, John Rawls considers the differences between his theory of “justice as fairness” and the classical utilitarian theory of justice. In the classical utilitarian view, what is “right is defined as that which maximizes the good.” (Rawls 22). Violating the rights of the few is therefore justified if it benefits the majority enough to maximize the good. Rational actors in the original position know that there is a chance they may be part of the minority group after the veil of ignorance is taken away, and will therefore not chose a utilitarian theory of justice. As Rawls says, “The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all.”

 

While Rawls’s framework certainly comes to different conclusions than the classical utilitarian view of justice, it seems his theory is still using some sort of maximizing principle and not necessarily separating good from right. I imagine that even behind the veil of ignorance, rational actors would still try to maximize their utility. The veil only requires them to maximize their expected utility by forcing them to consider the equal probability of being born into any random position in society.

If rational actors in the original position are still motivated by utility, then I don’t think it’s necessarily true that “persons in the original position would choose a principle of equal liberty and restrict economic and social inequalities to those in everyone’s interest.” (Rawls 26). Rational actors might be willing to restrict some level of liberties in order to maximize their expected utility --- e.g., restricting a farmer’s liberty to irrigate his land so that the town downstream has access to clean drinking water. It appears Rawls is not separating himself from the utilitarian calculus, just merely adding another variable.