Nagra Blog Post 5

    In chapter one, Shelby introduces his ideas on injustice by stating that they “fit within a number of liberal-egalitarian frameworks” (19). He says earlier in the reading that liberal-egalitarian insights stem from a combination of black nationalism, feminism, and notably, Marxism. What I was somewhat confused about was the use of Marxism in a slightly incomplete sense. I do not say this as a fault in liberal-egalitarianism, but more to see what Shelby’s ideas or critiques of Marxism would be. For example, liberal-egalitarianism relies somewhat on the state to equalize individual opportunities and minimize injustice. In Marxism, however, the state is non-existent. An odd tension here seems to develop between the two ideologies as they intersect with the same intention but different means.

    Later in chapter one, Shelby defines ideological doctrines as “developed theories” that are absorbed by the population through “assumptions propagated by the elites” (23). This, to me, seems rather Marxist, with the elites here being synonymous with the bourgeoisie. These ideologies seem to be what Marx refers to as the legitimization of economic disparities in society, relating to Shelby's idea that the elite assert that "black disparities ... are due to black's bad life choices and self-defeating attitudes" (28). I wonder then, does Shelby believe, unlike Marx, that these ideologies are the cause of economic inequality, or is it the opposite way around? 

    Shelby also adds that a “classless society is one with fluid mobility between income groups across generations,” but how does even a small amount of income disparity not cause classes (37)? Even a moderate amount of income inequality could be transmitted across generations, generating a larger wealth gap, along with more defined classes to form. How do Shelby’s ideas on justice and equality account for this? Do the mechanisms of egalitarianism prevent a cascade effect of class? 

My following ideas stem from Shelby’s assertion that “the account of unjust discrimination presented [] works mutatis mutandis for wrongful discrimination based on gender or class origins” (35). This logically can be extended to gender identity and sexuality. In cases like the refusal to make a wedding cake for a gay couple or the prevention of gay couples from adopting children, the rules of wrongful racial discrimination seem to fit (albeit not about race). Discriminative practices against gay couples are based on “the normative presumption that one [sexuality] has inferior moral status to another” (34). Would this extension of injustice be extendable to sexuality and other discriminated groups? Moreover, there exists little to no situations in which it would be morally permissible to use discriminatory practices against the LGBT community.