Mehra- Blog Post 4

 In reading Chapter II of A Theory of Justice, I found Rawls’ presentation of the difference principle (Section 13) to be very interesting, especially against Marx’s theories. Raws illustrates this principle through the example of social classes. He posits that according to the difference principle, inequality is “justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse off” (Rawls 68). In other words, inequality is only justifiable when it makes the least advantaged group better off than they would be under a system of strict equality. He further distinguishes between two cases. In the first, the status of the least advantaged group is maximized. In the second, Rawls outlines a proportional response; as the expectations of the most advantaged group rise, the expectations of the least advantaged likewise rise, despite not having reached a maximum (Rawls 68). 

To illustrate the tension between Marx and Rawls regarding inequality, imagine that there are two cakes. In the first cake, all of the pieces are equally small slivers. In the second cake, the pieces are split up unequally; the slice size varies. However, the smallest slice of the second cake is larger than each slice of the first cake. Despite the inequalities within the second cake,  the man who is the worst off is going to be better of than if he had taken a piece from the cake of equal and identical slices. The enhanced utility despite inequality is central to Rawls’ presentation of the difference principle. 

However, based on his arguments in “On the Jewish Question” and “The German Ideology,” Marx might see the existence and perpetuation of inequality as problematic, and the system that creates it as unjust. Even though Rawls’ theory results in the least advantaged group gaining the greatest possible expectation, the existence of a least advantaged group by the free market system would be something of concern to Marx. In considering Marx’s perspective, it is important to stress the conditions of justice in which Rawls outlines his theory. Specifically, he writes “How unjust an arrangement depends on how excessive the higher expectations are and to what extent they depend upon the violation of the other principles of justice” (Rawls 68). This raises the question: assuming a perfectly “just” society (as Rawls would define it), would Marx’s criticisms be leveled as strongly? And what does this tension suggest about the different definitions of justice and freedom that Marx and Rawls have?

For example, consider a society in which the only inequality between people is talent; some are born naturally more talented than others. As Rawls would demand, those of equal talents have equal access to opportunities. Inevitably, a division is created between the more and less talented that may subsequently manifest in more tangible differences, such as wealth. For me, this scenario raises questions that challenge both Marx and Rawls. For Marx: the only “inequality” between men in this society being God-given talent within a free-market system. Should that “inequality” determined by a man’s talent not yield him a greater reward, especially if it is also yielding the least advantaged a greater reward? What does this communicate about Marx’s perception of freedom? And for Rawls: would the initial departure in talent not eventually yield more substantive injustices that are ultimately “excessive?” Even within a system that is perfectly just, will injustice not inevitably arise?