Huang - Blog Post 5

 In the book Dark Ghettos, Tommie Shelby defines the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic racism and the nuances of their implementation. Shelby defines intrinsically racist institutions as ones that maintain policies that are inherently regarded as racist or passed for the value of racism. On the other hand, extrinsically racist institutions are ones that are racist “solely in virtue of the policies’ effects” (24). This means that there may be no racist intent or racist reason for a policy, but the effect it perpetuates is one of racial injustice. After these definitions, Shelby dives into an example of extrinsically versus intrinsically racist institutions or policies. He highlights his comparison with the real-life example of racial profiling in policing. He argues that even if racial profiling is not accepted because policymakers have intrinsically racist beliefs, that this policy may still result in racist results in practice. 

Ultimately, whether an institution is intrinsically racist or not is not significant because the result would still lead to racist practices. However, in response to this background, Shelby argues that the disadvantaged group would be justified in “demanding that crime control strategies be chosen that do not have these adverse effects or, if no alternative policy would reduce crime to tolerable levels, that group members be compensated for the extra burdens the policy imposes” (25). 

This assertion at first glance appears acceptable, but it is not for three reasons. First, it is unclear in what way someone can be compensated. Many people might assume that this compensation comes in the form of money, which it historically has. This brings me to the next point. Second, in many instances, the burden that should be compensated for cannot or would be incredibly difficult to quantify. Let’s take the example of eminent domain, which is that the government can decide that it would be in the best interest of the public to acquire private property—given conception usually in correspondence with market value. However, calculating the value of private property is almost impossible—if not impossible—for two reasons.  (1) As biased beings, everyone values their private property differently. (2) It is difficult to justifiably calculate the cultural, traditional, or just personal value that someone places on that property. Third, the idea that a policy can still legitimately be passed even at the cost of adverse effects to some of the population does not consider consent, which harkens to Shelby’s own argument of “forced integration (75). 

As such, it raises some important questions. What does fair and effective compensation look like? What examples does Shelby have in mind when he writes about this? And how can there be necessary consent for this to be justifiable? And if none exists, then how can it be justifiable when it necessarily considers some peoples’ rights to liberties as less significant than others?