Fish- Blog Post 4

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls provides an account of his conception of justice: justice as fairness. In so doing, he explains how justice as fairness is a critical aspect of rational choice and social ideals. In order for rational men to make rational decisions related to justice, Rawls explains, it is essential that “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like” (Rawls 11). This is necessary to establish justice as no one would be acting in favor of his particular conditions. 


Because Rawls believes that “the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance,” I am reminded of Marx and his perception of the communist revolution (Rawls 11). To Marx, communism is the system of justice because it does away with ideology, oppression, class struggle, and the division of labor. In a communist state Marx would be able to “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner” (Marx 160). When Rawls writes that “a society satisfying principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme,” these similar ideals are reflected. It is ultimately a society where “members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed” that speaks to both Rawls and Marx as the end-goal of justice. 


However, the “veil of ignorance” that Rawls believes in would contradict Marx. While Rawls believes this veil of ignorance is vital for achieving justice, Marx believes that the veil of ignorance exists before justice is reached, and the veil, or inversion he describes, must be lifted in order to reach justice. To reach justice, Rawls feels that humankind must ignore their hierarchical status while Marx feels that hierarchy needs to be eradicated entirely. 


Yet, both Marx and Rawls seem to rely on the fact that this sort of status erasure is possible in the first place. When looking at Gabrielle Johnson’s writing on algorithmic bias, the feasibility of reaching the level of objectivity both Rawls and Marx seem to be seeking comes into question. Rawls describes the “impartial spectator” as the lens through which societies should try to create the principles of justice. This “perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own” does not exist (Rawls 24). While Rawls does not try to claim that this person exists, he does seem to argue that this is the most justifiable way to go about applying utilitarianism and compensating for the fact that utilitarianism does not “take seriously the distinction between persons” (24). But looking at Johnson’s argument, if we cannot even trust algorithms that are deemed to be the most effective and objective decision-makers, how can we trust human beings to create principles of justice as fairness with the idea that they should try to be the impartial spectator? Both Marx and Rawls leave me feeling confused at how the end-goals of justice, autonomy, and, debatably, equality can be reached if they require a sense of objectivity, or a “veil of ignorance” to lead society there.


Comments

Wills Spangler said…
The “end goals” you refer to is an extremely interesting point and opens up the discussion about the ultimate trajectory of society (if such a thing even exists). The impossibility of reaching a certain level of objectivity does not make the discussion of the “perfectly ration individual” irrelevant. To me, the most fascinating aspect of Rawls’ original position is the idea of reflective equilibrium and the way it separates fairness from the debate of the ultimate goal of humanity. He argues that because there are discrepancies in the principles that different individuals see as “provisional fixed points,” (18) it is necessary to attempt to reconcile with other perspectives or re-evaluate/revise our own perspectives. In doing so the goal is that “we shall find a description that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted,” (18). Social justice is an innately cooperative venture. By encouraging the individuals to attempt to embody the “perfectly rational individual,” the discussion naturally leads to explanations of differing interpretations of what the goal of the “perfectly rational individual” is in society. By comparing and contrasting one’s views with the views of the around them, one is able to acquire a more well-rounded sense of societal duty.
The reason I believe that this is so crucial is that I do not believe that society as an institution has a single set direction that we can identify through self-evident reasoning and simply ‘achieve.’ This is where I believe Marx differs greatly from Rawls, as Marx implies there is a correct outlook, saying “when we conceive things thus, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved…into an empirical fact,” (170). Simply put “see things the right way (my way) and all the hard questions turn into simple correct answers (my answers).” Because society is the cooperation of individuals in the present, it is essential that this discussion is accepted as endless. The conception of justice within that society “is a matter of mutual support of many claims, of fitting everything together into one coherent view,” (19). Reflective equilibrium, as a method for deducing societal principles, bears a striking similarity to deductive reasoning as defined by Johnson. It ensures that each principle is being evaluated as new information/perspectives are introduced to ensure that one’s present views are rational and sound under as many relevant situations as possible. In doing so, one gains a better understanding of the goals of other individuals in society and can attempt to better society based on the present principles of those within it.
Paul Hurley said…
Cool post and cool comment! There is a lot going on in Olivia’s post, but Wills picks up on a really interesting thread in it. Rawls’ does think a just society must allow space for reasonable disagreement, e.g. for avowed atheists who think religion is a delusion, and fundamentalist Christians who think such atheists will burn in hell. Picking up on Wills’ first point, he also doesn’t seem to think that a just society is aiming AT anything in an important sense. His is an accout of “pure procedural justice,” holding that what emerges through just procedures, whatever it is, is just.

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