Awesome set of posts; and some thoughts about objectivity

First, let me just say that, having read over your blog posts, I find myself blushing with other-directed pride!

Several of you draw intriguing parallels between Harris's argument and Johnson's (Olivia, Alexis, Cam), and between the role of canons in inductive inference and the role of canons in statutory interpretation (Jess).  These are fascinating claims, and I look forward to exploring them.

Harris is of particular interest to me here, moreover, because although she argues that doctrines that claim to be unbiased, just, neutral, and fair, e.g. strict scrutiny, colorblindness, and a corrective justice framework, are not, she advocates for approaches that she takes to be in some sense unbiased (less biased), just, and fair.  The standard interpretations claim to be unbiased, but are in fact biased in ways that serve to perpetuate a property interest in whiteness.  But exposing this bias helps us see our way clear to other principles, e.g. strict scrutiny for the oppressing category "black" but not for the oppressive category of "white" and a distributive/corrective rather than merely a corrective justice framework for assessing the constitutionality of affirmative action, principles that are, in fact, (more?) just, less biased, and fair.

Harris seems to be operating with the view that recognizing the value-ladenness of canons of constitutional interpretation, for example, is a crucial step towards developing interpretations that are, in fact, less biased (or, in Prof. Johnson's terminology [perhaps], informed by better, more defensible biases) and better than those currently in ascendance. 

With this in mind, notice that many of you make one or more of the following inferences in your blog posts.  

If something is objective, then it is value free. 

If it is not value free, then it is not really objective.  

Canons of inductive inference and of statutory interpretation are not value free.  

So the domains of science and law are not really objective.  

If they are not objective, then they are subjective and/or relative.  

If they are subjective and/or relative, then we should despair (see Cam's experience of hopelessness), or understand that any claims made are relative to a set of values (see Wills' proposal) 

Clearly, however, Harris is arguing that exposing the value-ladenness of the canons informing statutory interpretation (see Jess's discussion of stare decisis) does not lead to despair, but to better, less biased, more defensible interpretations of the relevant texts, and better, less biased, more defensible applications of them to issues like affirmative action.  So she must reject some of the inferences involved in the above line of thought.