Gero - Blog Post 1

    In Of Public Jurisprudence in “Lectures on Jurisprudence”, Smith asserts that allegiance to the civil magistrate is not accomplished through contract and provides several examples to support this claim (par. 15). Earlier, in Of Justice, Smith defines a contract as “the reasonable expectation which the person who promises raises in the person to whom he binds himself; of which the satisfaction may be extorted by force,” (par. 10). While Smith’s definition of “contract” is constrained to the realm of personal rights, these personal rights are ensured as a part of an estate, protected by the justice of the civil magistrate. Therefore, I disagree with Smith and assert that by his definition, personal rights are extended into the realm of civil magistrate and are upheld through contract, as demonstrated with the following three examples. 

The first of Smith’s examples is that obedience to the civil magistrate is not commanded by an explicit contract. Obedience is instead awarded because “it is right to do so, that he sees others do it, that he would be punished if he refused to do it, or perhaps that it is a sin against God not to do it,” (par. 18). All of these reasonings fall somewhere within Smith’s definition of contract. Acting obediently as being “the right thing” or adherence to public behavior aligns with the “reasonable expectation” of compliance to a contract. Similarly, the threat of punishment or religious retribution are examples of “satisfaction… extorted by force.” Smith argues that obedience to the civil magistrate is instead guaranteed by authority and utility, but that doesn’t apply to compliance being “the right thing” or to avoid religious consequences. 

Smith’s second example is that at birth one does not agree to a contract with the civil magistrate, like a man waking up on a ship doesn’t automatically submit all authority to the captain (par. 16). By that faulty reasoning, one does not agree to anything: one does not agree to God’s punishment, one does not agree to be raised by their parents, and one does not agree to be born. 

Finally, Smith reasoning that breach of allegiance or high treason is prosecuted much more harshly than a regular breach of contract, meaning that these must be on “different footing,” (par. 17). While I agree that these crimes vary in severity, that does not necessarily imply that allegiance to the civil magistrate isn’t a contract. Obedience to the civil magistrate is a contract with the state, which would presumably hold more weight than one between two individuals. Therefore, the prosecution would reflect the variance in extremity of both contracts.